

RECORDS CODE SHEET
SND 4535 (Rev. 1/65)

NAVAL AVIATION SAFETY CENTER

GENERAL (Card No. 1)

SUPPLEMENTARY (Card No. 2)

Bureau Number	152976	16-21	Weather		16-21
Reporting Custodian	235	22-24	Kind of Flight	1A2	22-24
Type Duty	2	25	Relative Wind - Direction	X	25
Major Command	2	26	Relative Wind - Velocity	?	26
Aircraft Damage	A	27	Special Attention	-	27
Aircraft Injury	B	28	Clearance	2	28
Time of Day	2	29	Maneuver prior to Occurrence	-	29
Carrier Hull Number	X	30	Number of other Aircraft	-	30
First Accident type	G	31-32	Primary Causal Factor	-	31-32
First Accident phase	47	33-35	Altitude of Occurrence or Emergency	1012	33-35
Second Accident type	B3	36-37			
Second Accident phase	A2	38-40	Environmental Factors	-	38-40
Type of Operation	23	41-42			
Contributing Cause Factors	SA	43-47	Non-Navy Injury ("R")	-	42
Pilot Factor, First	-	48-49	Number of "A" or "U" Injury	-	43-44
Pilot Factor, Second	-	50-51	Number of "B" Injury	-	46-47
Pilot Factor, Third	-	52-53	Number of "C" Injury	-	48-49
First other Personnel Factor	-	54-55	Number of "D" Injury	-	50-51
Second other Personnel Factor	-	56-57	Number of "E" Injury	-	52-53
Primary Major Material Factor	-	58	Number of "F" Injury	01	54-55
Secondary Major Material Factor	-	59	Number of "G" Injury	01	56-57
Design	-	60	Location	E5CVA162	62-68
Facilities	-	61			
Special Data & Cond.	712H2	62-65			
Special Data & Cond./Type of Incidence	-	66			
Primary Cause	Y	67	ACCIDENT DAMAGE	A 9	
1st Posit. of Pri. Causal Factor	-	68	I. D.	69617101	
1st Possible Cause & Causal Factor	37	69-71	NO. YR MO	DAY TYPE SEQ	
2nd Possible Cause & Causal Factor	-	72-74	-	-F4R	
No Personnel Card ("R")	-	80	FISCAL YEAR	C 75	

Model Code 13
76-77

PERSONNEL STATISTICS
(Card No. 3)

File Number → (b) (6)

Name 16 17 18 19 20 21

03 (b) (6)

22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 35 37 40 42 45 47 49 51 52-53 55 56-57 58-59 62-63 65-66 68 69-70 71-72 73-74
31 A 9 A 1 E 2 2 4 6 3 2 7 1 7 1 4 0 7 6 0 7 = 3 9 7

04 (b) (6)

Name 16 17 18 19 20 21

File Number → (b) (6)

IBM PERSONNEL CODED ON REVERSE SIDE CODED (b) (6) REVIEWED *s* LOGGED *s*PUNCHED *m* VERIFIED *s*

12 AUG 1966

CODE SHEET REVIEWED BY CLASS DESK ANALYST _____

(Initials)

CLOSED

(Date)

29 JUL 1966

07-28-66

REQUEST FOR CODE SHEET CHANGES

From: Demo Dept.To: (1) Coder d-c:ml
(2) M&M
(3) Log Clerk att 9-22-66
(4) IBM
(5) File Clerk

8-18-66

(Date)

29 SEP 1966

Return to: Open File _____
Closed File _____
Master Coder _____
Other _____Ident. No. 60 617141 Model F-15 BUNO 152976 Model Code 13Card #1 - Chg. col. _____ to _____
" " _____ to _____
" " _____ to _____
" " _____ to _____Chg. col. _____ to _____
" " _____ to _____
" " _____ to _____
" " _____ to _____Card #2 - Chg. col. 54-55 to 41
" " 56-57 to -
" " _____ to _____Chg. col. _____ to _____
" " _____ to _____
" " _____ to _____Card # 03 Name (b) (6) Chg. col. 47 to F
" " _____ to _____
" " _____ to _____
" " _____ to _____Card # _____ Name _____ Chg. col. _____ to _____
" " _____ to _____
" " _____ to _____
" " _____ to _____

USE THIS SECTION FOR CHANGES TO CARDS 31 THROUGH 59 AND CARDS 20 THROUGH 29.

Card # _____ Chg. col. _____ to _____
" " _____ to _____Card # _____ Chg. col. _____ to _____
" " _____ to _____ Card #(s) _____ IBM, SEE CHANGES TO NARRATIVE BRIEF.
ORIGINATOR, USE REVERSE SIDE FOR CHANGES TO BRIEF.NOTE: (1) A separate change sheet will be used for each A/C involved.
(2) Change sheet will be stapled to code sheet.

(b) (6)

Originator's Signature

 Change to 5 x 8 card required.

John G. 9-72

(b) (6)

Jan 207

Cd. 65

Cd. 65A

Cd. 55B

Aero-Med Cd. 66

ID NO.	GCI	MODEL	PT	MODEL CODE
60617101-	00	-FyB	6	13

Aero-Med Card No. 67

ccccB

4

Aero-Med Card No. 68

21D 8484 DEC 24 B

AADBΦΦ

101

Bise

I. D. NO.	GCI.	MODEL	PT	MODEL CODE		
60617101	00	-F48	6	13		
Equipment	Equipment	Equipment	I N J	No. of cds.	Z on e	Seq. of Indiv.
484505	52535556575859	40414243444546474849	707172	7374		
N200MVR300IW B2			B13	02		

Cd. 65

T.	I	C.	Seq.
A.	N	Z	of
M	J	o	Indiv.
18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74			
DAE2 F5 LS OI PI P2 PA AI B23			
Cd. 65A			

Cd. 65A

Cd. 558

ID NO.	GCI	MODEL	FY	MODEL CODE
108617181	00	-F48	6	13

Aero-Med Card No. 67

Aero-Med Card No. 68

MAINTENANCE AND MATERIAL CODE SHEET (Narrative brief on reverse)

SNR 4631 (Rev. 11/59)

MAINTENANCE AND MATERIAL CARD NUMBER 33			CARD COL.
PRIMARY INVOLVED MATERIAL COMPONENT			16-21
SECONDARY INVOLVED MATERIAL COMPONENT			24-29
POSSIBLE INVOLVED MATERIAL COMPONENT	T 1 1 1		32-37
SPECIAL DATA AND CONDITIONS	E 1 8		40-42
SPECIAL DATA AND CONDITIONS	I 4 5		44-46
SPECIAL DATA AND CONDITIONS	I 4 0		48-50
SPECIAL DATA AND CONDITIONS	T 1 6		52-54
SPECIAL DATA AND CONDITIONS			56-58
SPECIAL DATA AND CONDITIONS			61-63
FIRST MAINT FLT/SPEC COMPONENT			65-68
CARD NUMBER	3	3	79-80

MAINTENANCE AND MATERIAL CARD NUMBER 35								CARD COL.		
POSSIBLE OR SECONDARY INVOLVED MATERIAL COMPONENT:										
MFG P/N									16-31	
TOTAL HOURS									34-37	
OVERHAUL ACTIVITY									39	
NUMBER OF OVERHAULS									41	
HOURS SINCE OVERHAUL									43-46	
POWER PLANT MODEL NUMBER	J 7 9 G E 8 8								49-56	
POWER PLANT SERIAL NUMBER	4 2 1 8 6 8								58-64	
DIR									68	
CARD NUMBER								3	5	79-80

<i>07-29-66</i>	M&M CODING RECORD		
COORDINATOR	<i>1-13 atk</i>		
DIVISION OFFICER	DATE CODED	CODED BY	LOGGED

M
PUNCHED 12 AUG 1960
VERIFIED

MAINTENANCE AND MATERIAL CARD NUMBER 34			CARD COL.
PRIMARY INVOLVED MATERIAL COMPONENT:			
MFG P/N	NO DATA		16-31
TOTAL HOURS			34-37
OVERHAUL ACTIVITY			39
NUMBER OF OVERHAULS			41
HOURS SINCE OVERHAUL			43-46
AIRCRAFT TOUR			48
AIRCRAFT FLIGHT HOURS SINCE ACCEPTANCE		6	50
AIRCRAFT FLIGHT HOURS SINCE LAST INSPECTION	1	2	53-55
DAYS SINCE LAST AIRCRAFT INSPECTION	K	K	57-58
TYPE LAST AIRCRAFT INSPECTION		B	61
MONTHS SINCE PAR/OVERHAUL			67-68
CARD NUMBER	3	4	79-80

CAUSE FACTORS	Z								
COMPONENT NO. 1									
COMPONENT NO. 2									
DESIGN									
POSSIBLE CAUSE FACTORS	3								
COMPONENT	T								
ACCIDENT DAMAGE				Don't Count	Empty Aircraft	Other Aircraft			
				I.D. NO.	YR	MD	DAT	TYR	SEQ
ACCIDENT INJURY				-F4C					
				11	12	13	14	15	Model
									Model Code
									13
									76 77

FOR IBM		REPORT NUMBER	
AUG 1960	CONFIDENTIAL	FOR IBM FILING ONLY	
ED	VERIFIED	CUSTODIAN	
MODEL	BUNO	DATE	IDENT. NUMBER

16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68
 UPON COMPLETION OF
 CAT SHOT # IMMED FOLLOWING FLAP RETRACTION, PORT ENG
 FIRE WARN LIGHT CAME ON. RIO NOTED STABILATOR TRIM
 INDIC CIRCUIT BREAKER WAS POPPED. PLT RETARDED PORT
 THR TO IDLE & LIGHT WENT OUT. THIRTY SEC LATER STBD
 FIRE WARNING CAME ON. PWR WAS REDUCED TO 85% ON STBD
 & ADV TO 85% ON PORT & PORT FIRE WARNING LIGHT CAME
 ON. THE MOVEMENT BECAME DIFFICULT & FURTHER ATTEMPTS
 TO MOVE THEM PROVED FUTILE. A THUMP WAS HEARD FOLLOW-
 ED BY FLASHING WHEELS WARNING LIGHT. SEVERAL CIRCUIT
 BREAKERS BEGAN POPPING & BOTH GEN FAIRED. ELECT PUR
 REAINED WITH RAT. PLT JETTISONED ALL EXT STORES.
 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68
 SIXTY SEC LATER ALL CIRCUIT PKS STARTED POPPING & RIO
 COULD NOT RESET. FIRE WAS OBSERVED IN AREA AFT OF
 TRAILING EDGZ OF PORT WING ROOT. RIO EJECTED. PLT
 SECURED PORT ENG & EJECTED. CAUSE UNDETERMINED, SUS-
 PECT POSSIBLE FAILURE IN BLEED AIR DUCTING SYSTEM,
 RESULTING IN HIGH TEMP & FIRE.

AAR ADMINISTRATIVE CLOSE-OUT FORM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Subj: VF-84 AAR 1-66A concerning F4B
(Activity) (Number) (ACFT Model)
BUNO 152976 occurring 6/17/66 pilot (b) (6)
(Date)

Ref: (a) Code 50 MEMO of 20 Mar 1968

1. In accordance with reference (a), a close-out letter will not be prepared on subject AAR.

Respectfully
(b) (6)

for
(b) (6)
Head, Records Division

24 JUL 1966

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES

SIXTH ENDORSEMENT on VF-84 AAR ser 1-66A concerning F-4B BuNo 152976
accident occurring 17 June 1966, pilot (b) (6)

From: Commander, Naval Air Systems Command
To: Commander, U. S. Naval Safety Center

Subj: Aircraft Accident Report

1. Forwarded.
 2. The F-4 Bleed Air System has undergone extensive study by the contractor and changes have been proposed. ECP-759 and ECP-254 which provide for incorporation of a BLC shut off and warning system in the F-4 aircraft have been approved. The hardware for these changes is currently under development and production of kits is expected to commence early in Fiscal Year 1970. In addition ECP-817 (F-4 Airframe Change 393) approved 1 November 1967 provides for incorporation of improved BLC ducts in all new production F-4 aircraft. It is anticipated that kits for Airframe Change 393 will be available commencing in December 1968.
 3. The F-4 NATOPS manuals have been revised to include more definitive information regarding pilot recognition of Bleed Air failures. In addition specific pilot action has been included in order to minimize damage in the event of BLC failure.

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

By direction

Copy to:

COMMA VALIANT

COMS3CONDFLT

CONCORDIV SIX

CO. USS INDEPENDENCE (CVA-62)

COMCVW-7

CO. VF-8A

NAVPLANTREE PO ST LOUIS

NAVY BUREAU OF
NAVAERORRHOVTPAC

CNAL 30S
Ser: 4218

25 AUG 1966

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6 SERIES

FIFTH ENDORSEMENT on VF-84 serial 1-66A, concerning F-4B, BuNo 152976, accident occurring 17 June 1966, pilot (b) (6)

From: Commander Naval Air Force, U. S. Atlantic Fleet
To: Commander, U. S. Naval Aviation Safety Center
Via: Commander Naval Air Systems Command

Subj: Aircraft Accident Report

Ref: (a) COMNAVAIRLANT msg 152209Z JUL NOTAL

1. Readdressed and forwarded, concurring with the conclusions and recommendations of the Aircraft Accident Board as modified by subsequent endorsements subject to the following comments.
2. Commander Naval Air Force, U. S. Atlantic Fleet addressed the problem of bleed air failures in reference (a) and requested that maximum effort be applied to decrease the susceptibility of the F-4 to fire from bleed air failures. Commander Naval Air Systems Command is requested to comment on recommendation 2 of the Board and on the request contained in reference (a).
3. There is an urgent need for the development of procedures to be followed when bleed air leakage is suspected as discussed in paragraph 3 of the first endorsement. Commander Naval Air Systems Command is requested to develop and promulgate such procedures on a priority basis.

(b) (6)

, By direction

Copy to:
COMNAVAVNSAFECEN (2)
COMSECONDFLT
COMCARDIV SIX
CO, USS INDEPENDENCE (CVA-62)
COMCVW-7
CO, VF-84
NAVPLANTREPO ST LOUIS
Naval Aerospace Recovery Facility
El Centro, California


FBB/32:rjm
3750
Ser 284

13 AUG 1966

FOURTH ENDORSEMENT on CO, Fighter Squadron 84, AAR Serial
1-66A, Pilot (b) (6)

From: Commander Carrier Division SIX
To: Commander Naval Aviation Safety Center
Via: Commander Naval Air Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet
Subj: AAR Serial 1-66A, Pilot (b) (6)

1. Redaddressed and forwarded, concurring with the conclusions and recommendations of the board and the comments of subsequent endorsers.
2. By copy of this endorsement the Commanding Officer, USS INDEPENDENCE is directed to forward a copy of the third endorsement to COMCVW-7 and Commanding Officer, VF-84.



GEORGE P. KOCH

Copy to:

NAVAVNSAFECOM (1)
NAVAIRSYSCOM (1)
COMSECONDFLT
NASCR, St. Louis, Missouri
CO, Naval Aerospace Recovery Facility
NASCR, Evendale, Cincinnati, Ohio
USS INDEPENDENCE (CVA62)
CVW-7
VF-84

ORIGINAL

ORIGINAL

OVA62:Code 04
2750
Ser 2125
5 August 1966

THIRD ENDORSEMENT on Commanding Officer, Fighter Squadron EIGHTY FOUR, AAR
Serial 1-66A, Pilot (b) (6) [REDACTED]

From: Commanding Officer, USS INDEPENDENCE (CVA-62)
To: Commander Naval Aviation Safety Council
Via: (1) Commander Carrier Division SIX
 (2) Commander SECOND Fleet
 (3) Commander Naval Air Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet

Subj: AAR Serial 1-66A, Pilot PATTERSON

1. Forwarded, concurring in the conclusions and recommendations of the Board
and subsequent endorsers.

John E. Kennedy
JOHN E. KENNEDY

Copy to:
NAVAVESAFECEN (2)
BUWEPS
COMNAVAIRLANT
CONSECONDFLT
NASCR, ST. LOUIS
CO, Naval Aerospace
Recovery Fac
NASCR Evendale, Cincinnati, Ohio

ORIGINAL

PP12/CAN-7/WPP:wsh
3750
Ser: 293
21 July 1966

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST P1350.6 SERIES

SECOND ENDORSEMENT on CO VF-84, AAR Ser 1-66A, Pilot (b) (6)

From: Commander, Attack Carrier Air Wing SEVEN
To: Commander Naval Aviation Safety Center
Via: (1) Commanding Officer, USS INDEPENDENCE (CVA-62)
(2) Commander Carrier Division SIX
(3) Commander Naval Air Force, U. S. Atlantic Fleet
(4) Commander Naval Air Systems Command

Subj: Aircraft Accident Report

1. Readdressed and forwarded, concurring with the conclusions and recommendations of the board with special emphasis on paragraph 2 of the first endorsement.
2. The undersigned views with alarm the number of in-flight fires occurring in F-4B aircraft. The loss of this aircraft is the second experienced by this Wing in the last three months, both resulting from fires in the after section of the engine bay. The fact that there was no indication of maintenance personnel error involved in either accident points toward the necessity for an immediate and thorough investigation into the basic cause of these fires.


R. H. GORMLEY

Copy to:

NAVAVNSAFECN (2 direct)
NAVAIRSYSCOM (1 direct)
COMNAVAIRLANT (1 direct)
COMSECONDFLT
COMCARDIV SIX (1 direct)
CO, USS INDEPENDENCE (CVA-62) (1 direct)
CO, VF-84
NASCR, St. Louis
CO, Naval Aerospace Recovery Pac.
NASCR Evendale, Cincinnati, Ohio

ORIGINAL

7 July 1966

FIRST ENDORSEMENT on Commanding Officer, Fighter Squadron EIGHTY FOUR, AAR
Serial 1-66A, Pilot (b) (6)

From: Commanding Officer, Fighter Squadron EIGHTY FOUR
To: Commander Naval Aviation Safety Center
Via: (1) Commander Attack Carrier Air Wing SEVEN
(2) Commanding Officer, USS INDEPENDENCE (CVA-62)
(3) Commander Carrier Division SIX
(4) Commander SECOND Fleet
(5) Commander Naval Air Force, U. S. Atlantic Fleet

1. Forwarded, concurring with the conclusions and recommendations of the board.

2. (b) (5)

(b) (5)


Compressor bleed air used to supply HLC air as well as numerous pneumatic systems is bled from the 17th stage of each engine and directed into a large (6" diameter) manifold through a "Y" connection. This large manifold, containing high temperature, high pressure air, is routed forward in the port engine bay alongside the keel. Shut off valves, actuated by flap retraction operate to secure the ducting to the leading and trailing edge flaps and thus prevent fire and/or overheating in these areas. Once these HLC shut offs are secured, the bleed air has a relatively unimpeded route to other systems and subsystems such as cockpit pressurization and air conditioning, rain removal, etc. Any bleed air leak, regardless of cause, cannot be secured at any point in the entire manifolding system except for the aforementioned HLC ducts. As a result, manifold rupture or failure of any of the numerous MARMON clamps, allows the bleed air free access to some of the most critical areas of the airframe, with no possibility of corrective action from the cockpit with predictable results as in this case. Accordingly, I recommend that NAVAIRSYSCOMD direct the manufacturer to redesign the system so as to incorporate pilot actuated shut off valves in each engine so that the pilot has the option to manually secure the entire bleed air flow from one or both engines. Thus should a reoccurrence arise in the future, the pilot could secure the bleed air flow, prevent the ensuing fire, and effect a safe landing, even though he would not have the use of bleed air supplied systems such as HLC, cabin pressurization and air conditioning and rain removal, etc.

3. The third recommendation of the board is particularly appropriate. A comprehensive study of the effects of leaks at various points in the system, and the beneficial effects of various cockpit actions, should replace existing conjecture with firm procedures. What are the effects of lowering flaps? What effect is gained by lowering the landing gear (opening Auxiliary Air Doors)? Is it preferable to operate one engine at high thrust settings or both at moderate settings? These and numerous other related questions beg for an answer.

ORIGINAL

4. It is particularly distressing to lose a valuable aircraft, so early in its service life, but if this accident generates corrective measures which prevent reoccurrences, then the price is acceptable. Certainly the problems associated with bleed air leaks are well documented by accident and incident reports which date back to the earliest operations of the PHANTOM II aircraft. All that remains is to formulate a coherent program encompassing the full spectrum of problems, and initiate the appropriate corrective action. (b) (5)

(b) (5)


A. E. WALLER

Copy to:

NAVAVNSAFECM (2 direct) (AAR)

BUWEPS (direct) (AAR)

COMNAVAIRLANT

COMSECONDFLT

COMCARDIV 6

CO, USS INDEPENDENCE

NASCR, ST. LOUIS

CO, Naval Aerospace

Recovery Fac

NASCR Evendale, Cincinnati, Ohio

ORIGINAL

DEPARTMENTAL COMMENTS FOR "CLOSE OUT" LETTER ON ORIGINAL
REVIEW

- NOTE: 1. Negative report is required.
2. Positive comments will be in a format suitable for inclusion in the
"close out" letter.
3. Attach additional sheets if more space is required.

M&M DEPT: None other than AMEN to paragraph 4 of CO's
endorsement 221D

822

See air last eng msg
152209Z
+ NASA HQ MSG
211815Z

62/B no comment

INITIAL/CODE

AERO-MED DEPT:

no comment
434/P

INITIAL/CODE

Commanding Officer: VF-84 AAF Ser: 1-66A Pilot: (b) (6)
Identification:

AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT REPORT

<u>IN FORM</u>	<u>TITLE</u>	<u>PART</u>	<u>PAGE NO.</u>
<u>THE ACCOUNT</u>	A Form 3750-1	I, II, III, IV	1, 2, 3
	B The Accident	V	4, 5
	C Damage to Aircraft	VI	6
	D The Investigation and Analysis	VII	7, 8, 9
	E Conclusions	VIII	10
	F Recommendations	IX	10

ENDORSEMENTS

(Reference: OPNAVINST P3750.6E, paragraphs 44.c and 44.b)

PART I GENERAL

1. AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT BOARD APPOINTED BY Commanding Officer FITRON EIGHTY FOUR		2. SERIAL NO. 1-66A	3. STG (LOCAL) OF MISHAP 171530QJUN	4. MODEL AIRCRAFT F4B	5. BUREAU NUMBER 152976
6. TO: Commander, Naval Aviation Safety Center		7. LOCATION OF MISHAP CVA-62 LAT 18-03N LON 64-38W		8. DAMAGE ALFA	
9. VIA: CVW-7 CO, USS INDEPENDENCE COMCARDIVVSIX COMSECONDEFLT COMNAVAIRLANT		10. TIME OF DAY DAY	11. TIME IN FLIGHT 0407	12. FLIGHT CODE 127	
		13. CLEARED FROM CVA-62	14. TYPE CLEARANCE VFR		15. AIRSPEED 230 Knots P
					16. A/C WEIGHT 38,000 lbs.
17. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF MISHAP Uncontrolled collision with water following crew ejection		18. ELEVATION AT TIME OF MISHAP 1200'		19. TERRAIN 1200'	
20. LIST MODELS, BUNS, REPORTING GUARDIAN AND DAMAGE CLASSIFICATION OF ANY OTHER A/C INVOLVED (Complete OPNAV Form 3750-1 for each A/C)					
NONE					

SECTION B. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS	FACTOR	FACTOR	FACTOR
	1. PILOT ERROR IN TECHNIQUE/JUDGMENT	9. SERVICING PERSONNEL	17. WEATHER
	2. PILOT DEVIATION FROM NATOPS PROCEDURES	10. LANDING SIGNAL OFFICER	18. DESIGN AIRCRAFT
	3. PILOT INCORRECT OPERATION OF A/C SYSTEM	11. OTHER PERSONNEL (Specify) X Installation	19. DESIGN CREW EQUIPMENT
	4. PILOT OTHER (Specify)	12. ADMINISTRATIVE	20. DESIGN OTHER (Specify)
	5. CREW	13. FACILITIES-RUNWAY, OVERRUN TAXIWAY, FLIGHT DECK	21. ROLLING/PITCHING DECK ROUGH SEAS
	6. MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL	14. FACILITIES-NAV AIDS, LANDING AIDS (GCA, CCA, ILS, MIRROR)	22. MATERIAL FAILURE/MALFUNCTION
	7. MAINTENANCE SUPERVISORY PERSONNEL	15. FACILITIES-CATAPULT, ARRESTING GEAR (Ship or field)	23. UNDETERMINED
	8. SUPERVISORY OTHER (Specify)	16. FACILITIES OTHER (Specify)	24. OTHER (Specify)

1. NAME (LAST, FIRST, & MIDDLE INITIAL)	2. GRADE	3. SERVICE NO.	4. GRADE/NR	5. GRADE NR	6. AGE	7. GRADE	8. GRADE	9. GRADE	10. GRADE
PILOT (AT CONTROLS AT TIME OF MISHAP)									
(b) (6)	LCDR	(b) (6)	1310	USN	(b) (6)	09	Pilot	Pilot	G
CO-PILOT (IDENTIFY & SIGN SEPARATE PAGE 11)									

SECTION C. PERSONNEL DATA PILOT EXPERIENCE IN HOURS	ITEM	ITEM	
11. ALL MODELS	2736	17. CV LANDINGS DAY/NIGHT	ALL 138 / 62
12. ALL MODELS IN LAST 12 MONTHS	380	18. FCLP LANDINGS LAST 6 MONTHS DAY/NIGHT	IN MODEL 16 / 7
13. ALL MODELS IN LAST 3 MONTHS	74	19. INSTRUMENT HOURS LAST 3 MONTHS ACTUAL/SIMULATED	ALL 5 / 2
14. ALL SERIES THIS MODEL	A/C 103 OPT/OPT 6 / NA	20. NIGHT HOURS LAST 3 MONTHS	IN MODEL 5 / 23
15. ALL SERIES THIS MODEL LAST 12 MONTHS	A/C 103 OPT/OPT 6 / NA	21. TOTAL HOURS IN JETS (if jet mishap) HELOS (if helo mishap)	1329
16. ALL SERIES THIS MODEL LAST 3 MONTHS	A/C 75 OPT/OPT NA / NA	22. LAST PRIOR FLIGHT ALL SERIES THIS MODEL	DATE 6/16/66 DURATION 1.8
23. DATE/GRADE LAST NATOPS STANDARDIZATION CHECK	4/28/66 QUA	TYPE INSTRUMENT CARD	SPEC

OTHER PERS.	25. NAME (LAST, FIRST, & MIDDLE INITIAL)	26. GRADE	27. RATE	28. BRANCH OF SERVICE	29. FILE/SERVICE NO.	30. UNIT	31. INJURY	32. BILLET	33. POSITION
	(b) (6)			LTC	USNR	(b) (6)		E	RIO REAR COCKPIT

ORIGINAL

IDENTIFY OTHER REPORTS CONCERNING THIS SUBJECT

1. AMFMUR SERIAL NUMBER _____
2. DIR MESSAGE REQUEST DATE-TIME-GROUP _____ Info BASIC on DIR request. See para 2E GENNAVINST P1750.8G
3. OTHER USS INDEPENDENCE 180030Z JUN Preliminary msg.rpt.
4. USS INDEPENDENCE 182320Z JUN Supplementary msg.rpt.

ORIGINAL

1. EQUIPMENT INVOLVED <input type="checkbox"/> CATAPOULT	2. PRESSURE SETTING <input type="checkbox"/> ARRESTING GEAR	3. WIND OVER DECK	4. RELATIVE WIND	5. APPROACH/END SPEED
6. MARK NUMBER	7. MODEL NUMBER	8. LOCATION ON SHIP	9. LAUNCHING BRIDE AND BRIDE ARRESTOR	
10. CATAPOULT/ARRESTING GEAR BULLETINS OR NOMOGRAMS USED				

11. This portion shall be completed whenever (1) an aircraft accident involves arresting gear barrier and/or barricade equipment, or (2) an aircraft accident involves malfunctioning of arresting gear, barrier and/or barricade equipment. Incidents or routine damage to cables, weldings and other expendable equipment need not be reported herein.

G. SHIPS DATA ENGAGED	12. DECK RUNOUT (FEET)	13. RAM TRAVEL (INCHES)	14. CONTROL VALVE SETTINGS		15. ACCUMULATOR PRESSURE (PSI)	16. COMMENTS (for cable failures specify no. landings and months in service)
			CONSTANT PRESSURE DOME (P.S.I.)	CONSTANT RUN-OUT (WT. LBS.) RATIO		
DECK PENDANT						
DECK PENDANT						
BARRIER/BARRICADE						

FOR ACCIDENTS ABOARD CARRIERS (Complete on pilot)

1. DATE DEPLOYED COMUS 13 JUN 66	2. DAY HOURS/LANDINGS SINCE DEPLOYMENT	3. DAY HOURS/LANDING LAST 30 DAYS
2. NO. DAYS OPERATING PERIOD 3	4. NIGHT HOURS/LANDINGS SINCE DEPLOYMENT 4/2	5. NIGHT HOURS/LANDING LAST 30 DAYS 15/4
3. INST. HOURS LOGGED SINCE DEPLOYMENT ACTUAL/SIMULATED 0/0	6. NIGHT HOURS/LANDINGS SINCE DEPLOYMENT 0/0	7. NIGHT HOURS/LANDING LAST 30 DAYS 6/1

WEATHER AT SCENE OF MISHAP

1. CEILING None	2. VISIBILITY 10	3. RELATIVE WIND DIRECTION AND VELOCITY	4. TEMPERATURE RUNWAY _____ OUTSIDE AIR _____	5. DEW POINT _____	6. ALTIMETER SETTING _____
7. OTHER WEATHER CONDITIONS (Winds aloft, icing level, sea state, density altitude, as appropriate) Waves 3 Feet Density Alt. +1920					

PART III ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

PART	SECTION	ITEM	REMARKS	2. COPY DISTRIBUTION
				2 CC NAVAVNSAFEON DIRECT (BAR)
				1 CC BUNEPS DIRECT (AAR)
				lcc CONNAVAIRLANT
				lcc CONSECOMPLT
				lcc CONCARDIVSIX
				lcc CO, USS INDEPENDENCE
				lcc NASCR ST. LOUIS
				lcc CO, NAVAL AEROSPACE RECOVERY FAC
				lcc NASCR EVA DATE
				'CINCINNATI', OHIO
				4 July 1966

3. GOVERNMENT PROPERTY

4. PRIVATE PROPERTY

(b) (6)	LCDR, USN Maintenance Officer FITRON 84	(b) (6)	LCDR, USN Administrative Officer FITRON 84
(b) (6)	(b) (6)	(b) (6)	(b) (6)
LT, USN CVW-7 Flight Surgeon		(b) (6)	Aviation Safety Officer, FITRON 84

* When preparing Incident and Ground Accident reports, items indicated by an asterisk in the upper right hand corner must be filled in. Other items considered appropriate should also be filled in.

ORIGINAL

V THE ACCIDENT

BuNo 152976, MOHIX No. 206, was one of four aircraft assigned to the 1530 launch from USS INDEPENDENCE with a mission of conventional weapons delivery on the Vieques impact area (enclosure 8). The aircraft was preflighted by a qualified Plane Captain (enclosure 6). Aircraft 206 was armed with six MK 86 practice bombs 3 each carried on TBRs mounted on Stations 1 and 9. In addition LAU 17s were mounted on Stations 2 and 8 and a 600 gallon centerline on Station 5 (enclosure 4). Launch weight was 47,000 lbs (enclosure 7a). A pre-flight brief was conducted by the flight leader in accordance with the NATOPS briefing guide. The briefing commenced one and one half hours prior to scheduled launch time. LCDR (b) (6) and LTJG (b) (6) attended the entire brief and manned 206 when directed by Air Operations one half hour prior to launch. Both the pilot and the RIO performed a NATOPS pre-flight inspection of 206. Fifteen minutes was available to perform the pre-flight inspection, check ordnance loads, and strap in prior to the call for starting engines. NATOPS pre-start, start, before taxi and pre-takeoff procedures were utilized. The challenge and reply method was used to complete the takeoff check list prior to taxiing over the shuttle in preparation for launch from Catapult #3. When given the tension-up signal the pilot advanced power to 80% on both engines and the aircraft was given an external check by the line trouble-shooter (enclosure 6). Upon signal from the catapult officer the pilot advanced power to military, checked the engines gauges which he determined to be indicating within the normal range, and advanced the power to maximum afterburner as he felt the initial acceleration of the catapult stroke. The catapult stroke was normal and after launch rotation and clearing turn were executed smoothly and smartly. No object was seen to strike the aircraft or fall from it during the launch phase (enclosure 7a). The landing gear was retracted when airborne at a speed of approximately 165 KIAS, and the flaps commenced retraction following the execution of a port clearing turn. The following events are depicted spatially in enclosure (9). Upon completion of flap retraction the pilot noted illumination of the port engine Fire Warning light and reported it to the RIO who checked all circuit breakers in, checked visually aft of the aircraft for indication of trailing smoke, and upon rechecking the circuit breakers observed that the stabilator trim indicator circuit breaker was popped. As the RIO was rechecking the circuit breakers and resetting the popped circuit breaker which stayed in, the pilot deselected afterburner, commenced wing dump, and retarded the port throttle to idle. The port fire warning light went out approximately 10 seconds after the port engine reached idle RPM. Wing dump was secured. An estimated 30 seconds later at 500 feet and 230 KIAS the starboard fire warning light illuminated. Power was reduced to approximately 85% in the starboard engine and advanced to 85% on the port engine. Almost immediately the port fire warning light reilluminated. (The force required to move the throttles was considerable higher than normal and once set, further attempts to move them proved futile). Within 5 seconds a thump was heard by both crewmen followed almost immediatley by illumination of the Flashing Wheels warning light. The light went out within an estimated 5 seconds. The pilot and RIO searched for but could discover no indications of fire in either cockpit. Several circuit breakers began popping on circuit breaker panel #1 rows B and C from #3 down. None would reset. Approximately 30 seconds later both generators failed almost simultaneously. Electrical power was regained by

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARAGRAPH 66, OPNAVINST P3750.6E

Ram Air Turbine extension and turning both generators to off and all external stores were jettisoned by actuation of the External Stores Emergency Release button. Altitude was increased to 1200 feet and airspeed to 230 KIAS. About 60 seconds later most all the circuit breakers in the rear cockpit began popping and would not reset. Indication of fire in the area aft of the trailing edge of the port wing root was observed by the airborne flight leader and ships' personnel (enclosure 6). The pilot indicated the possibility of ejection to the RIO. The RIO ejected. After hearing the RIO's seat fire the pilot noted port engine fuel flow increase to 8-9000 pph then slowly decreased to below 3000 pph, the EGT climbed to 1000° then drop below 600°, and RPM climb to in excess of 101% then begin to decrease. The port engine was secured with the engine master switch and the pilot ejected. The aircraft descended without unusual agitation, impacted the water nose down, and sank immediately. Both RIO and pilot's ejection seats functioned normally and all survival equipment operated satisfactorily except that the pilot's seat pan retaining straps broke during the opening shock of the parachute. Crewmembers were picked from the water by UH-2A using rescue seat. (enclosure 2)

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARAGRAPH 66, OPNAVINST P3750.6E

VI DAMAGE TO THE AIRCRAFT

F4B Bureau Number 152976 crashed at sea in 1780 fathoms with no possibility of recovery.

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARAGRAPH 66, OPNAVINST P3750.6E

PART VII THE INVESTIGATION AND ANALYSIS

The Aircraft Accident Board convened at 1600G on 17 June 1966 to investigate and analyze the circumstances surrounding the accident. The Board determined that:

1. F4B, BUNO 152976, MODEX 206, was on an authorized training flight. Both crewmembers are considered to have been completely qualified in all respects for the mission assigned.
2. The flight crew's pre-flight, start, before taxi, and post start checks were normal and complete and there was no evidence of fuel, hydraulic or bleed air leaks during the inspection of the aircraft by the plane captain, and catapult safety checkers (enclosure 6). The takeoff check-off list was completed using the challenge and reply method.
3. The catapult launch was normal as was the portion of the flight prior to flap retraction.
4. The port fire warning light in itself did not constitute an emergency situation, since a number of false indications of fire warning lights have occurred throughout the fleet in the F4. However, the pilot did recognize the possibility that an emergency situation could exist and reacted properly by retarding the port throttle to idle. LCDR (b) (6) correctly recognized that a probable emergency situation existed when the starboard and port fire warning lights both illuminated followed by a thump. The reactions of the crew throughout the sequence of events that ensued were considered proper and in accordance with NATOPS. These reactions were a tribute to their prior training.
5. Examination of the aircraft log books, discrepancy sheets and work registers revealed only one discrepancy germane to the investigation. Replacement of the right inboard transfer and low level shut off valve was completed on 30 April 1966 (enclosure 3). The installation was properly inspected and signed off by a qualified Quality Control Inspector and leak checked by engine turn-up. The aircraft had accumulated 52.6 hours flight time without further wing transfer problems or any evidence of fuel leakage.
6. Inasmuch as the aircraft was lost at sea any conclusions as to cause factors must necessarily be based on conjecture. During the investigation several possible causes were examined:
 - a. Foreign object damage to the port engine followed by failure of turbine blades resulting in damage in both engine compartments. The Board considers this highly unlikely noting the absence of any abnormal engine indications for the first six minutes of the seven minute flight.
 - b. Hydraulic leak and fire in the port engine bay followed by the destruction of the bulkhead between the engine bays. In as much as no fire or unusual smoke was observed during the first five and one half minutes of the flight, it is unlikely that an occurrence of this nature initiated the emergency. However, it is probable that such an occurrence occurred late in the

sequence of events. The thump (enclosures 4,5, & 9), heard by both crew-members was possibly caused by rupture of a 3000 psi hydraulic line (which was followed by the flashing wheels warning light).

c. Fuel leak and fire in the port engine bay. The Board considers this occurrence a remote possibility inasmuch as there was no vapor or smoke visible early in the flight and that a fuel fire in the engine would become visible first in the exhaust area of the fuselage instead of the trailing edge of the wing root. In addition abnormal engine indications probably would have been observed earlier in the sequence of events.

d. Bleed air leak of large proportion caused by failure (or improper installation) of a clamp or complete rupture of bleed air ducting within the engine compartment. The Board considers this to be the most probable cause of the accident. The port fire warning light illuminated shortly after raising the flaps. Flap retraction closes the leading and trailing edge ELC valves which significantly increases the pressure in the bleed air ducting and would markedly increase the mass flow of bleed air through any leak present in the system ducts. The high temperature (900°F) of the bleed air escaping into the engine compartment is capable of causing activation of the fire warning element. Other factors which lend themselves to this hypothesis are:

(1) The port fire warning light went out shortly after the engine reached idle RPM. This resultant reduction in bleed air mass flow may have temporarily reduced engine compartment temperature below fire warning element sensing temperature.

(2) The starboard fire warning light came on. The initial failure of the ducting may have occurred during catapult launch. Although retarding the port throttle reduced port engine bay temperature the pressure in the duct may have been sufficient to expand the original crack or rupture and permit significantly increased leak flow at the low pressure. The duct failure may have occurred near the crossover point and progressed through the bulkhead and subsequent leakage caused overheat of the starboard engine compartment.

(3) Port fire warning light reillumination after setting port throttle at 85%. ibid.

(4) The thump followed by a flashing wheels warning light. Possibly caused by rupture of the flap hydraulic lines which permitted flaps to drop from full up position and resulted in illumination of the wheels warning light. The light may have extinguished by electrical failure of the sensing wiring due to overheat.

(5) Circuit breakers popping and complete electrical failure. Excessive overheat could have caused various electrical circuits to fail with eventual generator failure. Although the RIO was unable to enumerate the circuit breakers that popped initially he did state that a number of CB in rows B & C of No. 1 panel from No. 3 down did pop prior to complete electrical failure (enclosure 5). These rows contain a number of circuits which are routed through the port engine bay and many are common at splice area CP-1 and CP-3.

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARAGRAPH 66, OPNAVINST P3750.6E

7. Another factor which tends to corroborate this hypothesis was a previous instance of bleed air duct failure in an F4B reported in VF-84 abbreviated incident report ser I-651 of 3 February 1965. (enclosure 10). The report described a sequence of events including frozen throttle and generator failure not unlike this accident.

8. Weather was not considered a factor in the accident. (enclosure 7b)

9. The ejection sequence was normal for both crew members (enclosure 7c). Both crewmen were current on ejection and survival training. When the pilot's personal parachute opened the seat pan retention straps (BWASMB 12-62) parted allowing the seat pan to drop to the vicinity of his knees due to improper stitching of the straps to the harness. No further difficulty was encountered. The RIO's injury (see enclosure 1) was determined to have occurred during the initial firing of the seat. He entered the water prior to inflating his MK3C. During the helicopter rescue he encountered difficulty in releasing his left rocket jet fitting attachment to the seat pan. There were no prior discrepancies recorded concerning this particular fitting. Cause of the difficulty is not determined. The fitting was not recovered because the harness were cut above the attachment.

10. NATOPS is not considered a factor in the accident. The RIO did not inflate his MK3C prior to entering the water as is recommended, however, his descent was relatively short (enclosure 5). NATOPS was complied with in all other respects. There are no change recommendations, however it is recommended that an investigation be conducted to develop a best course of action during a bleed air failure and if any aircraft configuration change (i.e. extend flaps, gear, etc.) would minimize damage, in event of a fire caused by bleed air failure.

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARAGRAPH 66, OPNAVINST P3750.6E

VIII CONCLUSIONS

The primary cause factor in this accident is undetermined.

In considering all aspects of the accident, the Board concludes the following, as possible or suspected cause factors:

1. Material failure - Failure in the bleed air ducting system (line, clamp or fittings) resulting in high temperatures and fire.
2. Installation error - Improper installation of duct line or marmon clamp. This could have resulted in a disconnect on the catapult stroke.

The Board concluded that air crew action in this accident was correct.

IX RECOMMENDATIONS

As a result of this accident the Board makes the following recommendations.

1. Continued emphasis should be placed on Quality Control with respect to the fabrication and installation of the bleed air system.
2. That the Naval Air Systems Command, in co-ordination with contractor continue to investigate the cases of bleed air failures in an effort to reduce their probability.
3. That emergency procedures for suspected bleed air failures be investigated and promulgated in NATOPS.

Commanding Officer, VF-84 AAR Ser 1-66A Pilot: (b) (6)

Identification:

ENCLOSURES

- 1 - Medical Officer's Report (Original only)
- 2 - Rescue Report, OPNAV Form 3750-13 (Original only)
- 3 - Maintenance Officer's Statement
- 4 - Pilot's Statement
- 5 - Crew Member's Statement
- 6 - Witness Statement in alphabetical order
- 7 - Other Statements
 - a. Catapult Officer
 - b. Aerologist
 - c. Aviation Equipment Officer
- 8 - Copy of Flight Plan
- 9 - Diagram of Sequence of Events
- 10 - Abbreviated Aircraft Incident Report

MEDICAL OFFICER'S REPORT
(ORIGINAL ONLY)

MEDICAL OFFICER'S REPORT OF A/C ACCIDENT, INCIDENT, OR GROUND ACCIDENT - PAGE 1
OPNAV FORM 3750-8 (REV. 3-63)

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED - See OPNAVINST 3750.6E for instructions.

OPNAV REPORT 3750-7

SECTION A - IDENTIFICATION

1. FROM (Name and mailing address of unit)				2. MOR NUMBER	3. LEAVE BLANK
FIGHTER SQUADRON EIGHTY FOUR F. P. O. N.Y. N.Y. 09501				1-66	

4. TYPE OF MISHAP <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> ACCIDENT <input type="checkbox"/> GROUND ACCIDENT <input type="checkbox"/> INCIDENT	5. TIME & ZONE 1550 Q	6. DATE 17 JUN 66	7. GEOGRAPHICAL LOCATION LAT 18° 03' SEC N LON 63° 38' SEC W
8. MODEL A/C F4B	9. BU NO 152976	10. NO. OF OCCUPANTS 2	11. DAMAGE CODE ALFA
12. UNIT OPERATING A/C VF-84			

13. INDIVIDUALS INVOLVED USE ADDITIONAL SHEETS IF REQUIRED NAME (Last, first and middle initial)	14. UNIT TO WHICH ATTACHED	15. RANK/ RATE	16. FILE/SERV. NO. DESIGNATOR	17. DUTY ASSIGNMENT ABOARD AT A/C MISHAP	18. DATE OF LAST PHYSICAL	19. PHYSICALLY QUALIFIED FOR FLIGHT	20. BRANCH OF SERVICE	21. INJURY CODE	22. DISPO- SITION
A (b) (6)	VF-84	LC DR	(b) (6)	A A	6-7 65	YES	USN F	H	
B (b) (6)	VF-84	LT JG	(b) (6)	I I	11-17 65	YES	USNRD	G	
C									
D									
23. CLARIFICATION OF ITEMS 13-22 WHEN NECESSARY									

24. MODEL OTHER A/C IF INVOLVED N/A	25. BU NO N/A	26. NO. OF OCCUPANTS N/A	27. UNIT OPERATING A/C N/A	28. DAMAGE CODE N/A	29. MOR NO N/A
--	------------------	-----------------------------	-------------------------------	------------------------	-------------------

30. NARRATIVE ACCOUNT OF MISHAP (Use additional 8 x 10½ sheets if required)

31. PRIMARY CAUSE FACTOR ASSIGNED BY ACCIDENT BOARD

UNDETERMINED

32. CONTRIBUTING CAUSE FACTOR ASSIGNED BY ACCIDENT BOARD

SEE AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT REPORT PART #7 PAGE #10

33. POSSIBLE CAUSE FACTOR ASSIGNED BY ACCIDENT BOARD

SAME AS #32

34. HAVE ALL FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, & RECOMMENDATIONS BEEN MADE AVAILABLE TO THE A/C ACCIDENT BOARD? IF NO, EXPLAIN.

YES NO

35. REPORT PREPARATION CHECK LIST

<input type="checkbox"/> ALL PARTS OF FORM COMPLETED	<input type="checkbox"/> DRAWINGS, SKETCHES, PHOTOS	<input type="checkbox"/> SURVIVORS' NARRATIVES	<input type="checkbox"/> WITNESS STATEMENTS	<input type="checkbox"/> CONCLUSIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS	<input type="checkbox"/> REQUIRED COPIES FURNISHED
--	---	--	---	--	--

36. REPORT FILED BY (Name & signature of medical officer)

DATE

37. FORWARDED TO (Name & signature of appointing authority)

DATE

(b) (6)

LT MC USNR

(b) (6)

8 JUL 66

J. Waller
A. E. WALLER CDR USN
COMMANDING OFFICER VF-84

8 JUL 1966

MEDICAL OFFICER'S REPORT OF A/C ACCIDENT, INCIDENT, OR GROUND ACCIDENT - PAGE 3

OPNAV FORM 3750-8B (REV. 3-63)

OPNAV REPORT 3750-7

SECTION E

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED — See OPNAV INST 3750.6E for instructions.
INDIVIDUAL CHRONOLOGICAL DATASEE PAGE 8 PARA. 10 OF INSTRUCTION
TO BE COMPLETED ON PLANE COMMANDER, PILOT, CO-PILOT, OTHER INDIVIDUAL
IN CONTROL OF AIRCRAFT AT TIME OF MISHAP, AND/OR INDIVIDUAL CAUSING THE MISHAP

USE LOCAL TIME AND BRIEFLY RECORD ACTIVITY WITHIN EACH COLUMN

48 HOURS PRIOR TO MISHAP

TIME		TIME	
15 JUN 66		0715	MORNING MEAL
1600	NORMAL READY ROOM ACTIVITY	1200	NOON MEAL
1800	EVENING MEAL	1400	BRIEF FOR STRIKE FLIGHT
1900-2400	PREPARATION FOR NEXT DAY OF FLIGHT OPERATIONS	1530	LAUNCHED FOR STRIKE FLIGHT
16 JUN 66			
0030	TURNED IN		
0600	AWOKE		
0630	MORNING MEAL		
1000	BRIEF FOR SPARROW SHOOT	1530 - 1550	AIRCRAFT MALFUNCTION
1130	LAUNCH FOR SPARROW SHOOT	1530 - 1550	EJECTED WITH OUT DIFFICULTY
1310	RETURN FROM SPARROW SHOOT		
1340	NOON MEAL		
1500	BRIEFLY		
1800	EVENING MEAL		
1900	TURNED IN	1600	PICKED UP BY HELICOPTER WITHOUT DIFFICULTY
17 JUN 66			
0030	AWOKE AND READ		
0300	WENT BACK TO SLEEP		
0700	AWOBED		

MOS NO.	MODEL A/C	BU NO.	TIME OF RESCUE	
			IDENTIFICATION OF INDIVIDUAL	
1-66	F4B	152976	A	
(b) (6)	LCDR USN	(b) (6)	1310	VF-84
DP-005				

MEDICAL OFFICER'S REPORT OF A/C ACCIDENT, INCIDENT, OR GROUND ACCIDENT - PAGE

OPNAV FORM 3750-6C (REV. 2-63)

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED - See OPNAVINST 3750.6E for instructions.

OPNAV REPORT 3750-7

SECTION F

1. INJURY CODE AND DISPOSITION				PATHOLOGICAL DATA				(Refer to Section F of Instructions.)			
				2. PRE-EXISTING PHYSICAL DEFECTS							
3. UNCONSCIOUSNESS <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO <input type="checkbox"/> YES DURATION:				NONE							
4. DROWNED		5. ASPHYXIATED		6. SHOCK		7. EXPOSURE		8. EXTENT OF CARBONIZATION		9. IF ADMITTED TO SICK LIST, GIVE DIAGNOSIS	
<input type="checkbox"/>		<input type="checkbox"/>		<input type="checkbox"/> MILD <input type="checkbox"/> MODERATE <input type="checkbox"/> SEVERE		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> MILD <input type="checkbox"/> MODERATE <input type="checkbox"/> SEVERE		<input type="checkbox"/>		N/A	
10. PLACE OF HOSPITALIZATION											
11. DURATION (See Instructions) 48 HOURS											
12. PRIMARY CAUSE OF DEATH											
13. GROUNDED? IF YES, GIVE REASON <input type="checkbox"/> NO <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> YES N/A											
14. SECONDARY CAUSE OF DEATH N/A											
15. AUTOPSY CONDUCTED BY: <input type="checkbox"/> PATHOLOGIST, MEDICAL OFFICER PRESENT <input type="checkbox"/> PATHOLOGIST, MEDICAL OFFICER NOT PRESENT <input type="checkbox"/> MEDICAL OFFICER											
16. <input type="checkbox"/> PROTOCOL ATTACHED <input type="checkbox"/> WILL BE FORWARDED											
17. WAS "AUTOPSY MANUAL, NAVMED PS065" USED? <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO N/A											
18. IF NO AUTOPSY CONDUCTED, GIVE REASON N/A											
19. INJURIES				PHASE SUSTAINED A E S R				CAUSE AND MECHANISM (If unknown, describe)			
(b) (6)				X				UNK			
20. REMARKS											

NONE

MOB NO.	MODEL A/C	BUNO	IDENTIFICATION OF INDIVIDUAL
1-66	F4B	152976	(b) (6)

NAME OF INDIVIDUAL

LCDR/USN (b) (6) /1310 VF-84

MEDICAL OFFICER'S REPORT OF AIR ACCIDENT, INCIDENT, OR GROUND ACCIDENT - PAGE 4A

OPNAV FORM 3750-8D (REV. 3-63)

OPNAV REPORT 3750-7



SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED. See OPNAV INSTR 3750.6E for Instructions

SECTION F (Continued)

SURFACE INJURIES


DESCRIBE AND SHOW GRAPHICALLY BY OUTLINING AND SHADING AFFECTED AREAS
ALL LACERATIONS, ABRASIONS, CONTUSIONS, PUNCTURE WOUNDS, SPRAINS AND BURNS
RECORD ALL INJURIES NO MATTER HOW TRIVIAL, WHETHER PATIENT LIVED OR DIED

(b) (6)



DETAILS OF SKULL FRACTURES AND BRAIN INJURY. DESCRIBE AND SHOW GRAPHICALLY

1. ALL FRACTURES, BY TYPE (Simple, depressed, or indirect, etc.) 2. SITES OF BRAIN LESIONS, IF ANY. 3. DISLOCATIONS OF MANDIBLE.



MOR NO.

1-66

MODEL A/C

F4B

BUNO

152976

IDENTIFICATION OF INDIVIDUAL

A


NAME OF INDIVIDUAL

(b) (6)



LCDR/USN

(b) (6)



1310

VF-84

MEDICAL OFFICER'S REPORT OF AN ACCIDENT, INCIDENT, OR GROUND ACCIDENT - PAGE 5

OPNAV FORM 3750-BF (REV. 3-62)

OPNAV REPORT 3750.7
SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED. See OPNAV INST 3750.6E for instructions

SECTION G

ESCAPE, PERSONAL AND SURVIVAL EQUIPMENT

LIST AND CODE IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION 6 OF INSTRUCTION:			PHASE CODES: A-ACCIDENT/MISHAP				E-ESCAPE/EGRESS PHASE	
			B-SURVIVAL				D-RESCUE PHASE	
EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION INCLUDING SPECIFIC MODEL DESIGNATION	MODIFICATION	RE-REQUIRED	AVAIL-ABLE	NEED	USED	FAILED	REMARKS (Explain failures, loss, and/or difficulty encountered. Use additional 8x10½ plain paper if needed.)	
HAT, HARD	APH-5	YES	YES	YES	YES	NO		
SUIT, SUMMER		YES	YES	YES	YES	NO		
FLYING		YES	YES	YES	YES	NO		
GLOVES, SUMMER		YES	YES	YES	YES	NO		
FLYING		YES	YES	YES	YES	NO		
BOOTS, AIRFORCE		NO	YES	NO	YES	NO		
JUMP	MK-3	YES	YES	YES	YES	NO		
VEST, LIFE		YES	YES	YES	YES	NO		
SEEKS KITS 1&2		YES	YES	YES	NO	NO		
SURVIVAL KNIFE		YES	YES	YES	NO	NO		
PISTOL	38 cal.	YES	YES	YES	NO	NO		
FLARES, DAY,NIGHT		YES	YES	YES	NO	NO		
GUN, FLARE		YES	YES	YES	NO	NO		
"G" SUIT, ANTI	Z-3	YES	YES	YES	YES	NO		

SECTION H

NARRATIVE OF ESCAPE/EGRESS, SURVIVAL AND RESCUE PHASES

SEE ENCLOSURE (2) PAGE (3)

MOR NO.	MODEL A/C	BUNO	IDENTIFICATION OF INDIVIDUAL
1-66	F4B	152976	A
NAME OF INDIVIDUAL			
(b) (6)	LCDR/USN	(b) (6)	1310 VF-84
DP-OFF			★ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1960-696328

MEDICAL OFFICER'S REPORT OF AN ACCIDENT, INCIDENT, OR GROUND ACCIDENT - PAGE 6 OPNAV REPORT 3750-7
 OPNAV FORM 3750-8G (REV. 3-63) SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED. See OPNAV INST 3750.6E for Instructions

SECTION I

DETAILS OF ESCAPE/EGRESS/SURVIVAL PHASES REFER TO SECTION I OF INSTRUCTIONS

I. TOPOGRAPHY OF INDIVIDUAL'S LANDING SITE

WATER LAND OTHER

II. TYPE OF EGRESS

EJECTION BAILOUT UNDERWATER NORMAL OTHER (Specify)

S	E	REMARKS
	3. NOT ATTEMPTED	
X	4. ATTEMPTED	
X	5. ACCOMPLISHED	
	6. THRU CANOPY	
X	7. PRIOR TO EGRESS	
	8. DURING EGRESS	
	9. SUBSEQUENT TO EGRESS	

10. GIVE TYPE AND MODEL OF EJECTION SEAT USED

MARTIN BAKER HIGH 5A/1

11. METHOD OF FIRING SEAT

PRIMARY SECONDARY OTHER

12. SEQUENCE OF EJECTION

NORMAL (SECOND)

13. POSITION OF SEAT ON EJECTION

UP DOWN FORWARD AFT OTHER

14. ATTITUDE OR MANEUVER OF A/C AT EXIT

LEVEL

15. AIRSPEED

230 KNOTS

16. ALTITUDE AT TIME OF EXIT (FEET)

ABOVE SEA LEVEL 1200'

ABOVE TOPOGRAPHY 1200'

17. ALTITUDE OF PARACHUTE OPENING

1200'

18. WEIGHT

225 POUNDS

19. TIME IN WATER

5 MIN

20. TIME IN RAFT

0 MIN

21. WIND VELOCITY

093 AT 24 KNOTS

19. AIRSPEED

22. WAVE HEIGHT

31

23. WAVE INTERVAL

3 SEC

24. AIR TEMPERATURE

84°

25. WATER TEMPERATURE

84°

20. WEIGHT

31

26. ALERTING FACTORS

VISUAL SIGHT FROM
USS INDEPENDENCE CV-62. PLANES IN THE
AIR.

SO.

SI.

SI.

SI.

SI.

SI.

27. MEANS OF LOCATING ACCIDENT SITE

SAME AS ABOVE

SI.

28. MEANS OF LOCATING SURVIVOR

SAME AS ABOVE

SI.

29. DID INDIVIDUAL DEPART FROM LANDING SITE?

(If Yes, Explain reason and sequence up to rescue)

NO YES

SECTION J

1. DATE OF LAST TRAINING

LPC 22 OCT 65

EJECTION TOWER

22 OCT 65

TRAINING FACTORS

EJECTION BEAT

22 OCT 65

SURVIVAL

30 DEC 65

2. DID THE LACK OF TRAINING AND/OR EXPERIENCE PLAY A PART IN ANY PHASE OF THIS MISHAP? (If yes, explain)

NO YES

MOR NO.

MODEL A/C

BUNO

IDENTIFICATION OF INDIVIDUAL

1-66

F4B

152976

A

(b) (6)

LCDR/USN

(b) (6)

1310

VF-54

MEDICAL OFFICER'S REPORT OF A/C AC 00000000000000000000000000000000 NT. INCIDENT - ON GROUND ACCIDENT - PAGE 1

OPNAV FORM 3750-5A (REV. 3-63)

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED. - See OPNAVINST 3750.6E for instructions.


OPINION REPORT 3730-7

SECTION B - FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO OR RELATING TO MISHAP BY PHASE OF MISHAP

SECTION C

- | FLIGHT TIME BY DATE | | | | |
|---|-----------|------------|------------|------------|
| 1. FLIGHT TIME LAST 30 DAYS
<i>(All models)</i> | 30 HOURS | | | |
| 2. FLIGHT TIME LAST 24 HOURS
<i>(All models)</i> | 02 HOURS | | | |
| 3. NO. FLIGHTS LAST 24 HOURS
<i>(Include present flight)</i> | 2 | | | |
| 4. TIME AT CONTROLS THIS FLIGHT | NONE | | | |
| 5. TOTAL FLIGHT TIME ALL MODELS | 800 HOURS | | | |
| FLIGHT TIME | 6. TOTAL | 7. LAST 30 | 8. 90 DAYS | 9. 90 DAYS |
| THIS MODEL | 700 | 30 | 70 | 120 |
| 10. NO. GROUNDED PAST YEAR | NONE | | | |
| 11. NO. DAYS GROUNDED PAST YEAR | 0 | | | |
| 12. DATES AND TYPES OF PRIOR MISHAPS | | | | |

SECTION D ANTHROPOMETRIC DATA (Compare with health record)



EIO's (NEO) STAT

LABORATORY TESTS AND RESULTS

INVESTIGATORY TESTS AND RESULTS					
SPECIMEN	TEST PERFORMED	RESULTS	SPECIMEN	TEST PERFORMED	RESULTS
(b) (6)					

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(b) (6)

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10 of 10

1

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104

(b) (6)

300-65000

(b) (6)

1

MEDICAL OFFICER'S REPORT OF A/C ACCIDENT, INCIDENT, OR GROUND ACCIDENT - PAGE 1

OPNAV FORM 3750-8B (REV. 3-65)

OPNAV REPORT 3750-2

SECTION E

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED — See OPNAV INST 3750.6E for instructions.

INDIVIDUAL CHRONOLOGICAL DATA

SEE PAGE 8 PARAGRAPH 10 OF INSTRUCTION

TO BE COMPLETED ON PLANE COMMANDER, PILOT, CO-PILOT, OTHER INDIVIDUAL
IN CONTROL OF AIRCRAFT AT TIME OF MISHAP, AND/OR INDIVIDUAL CAUSING THE MISHAP

USE LOCAL TIME AND BRIEFLY RECORD ACTIVITY WITHIN EACH COLUMN

48 HOURS PRIOR TO MISHAP

TIME		TIME	
15 JUN 66		1300	WORKED IN SPACES
1540	DEBRIEF FROM HOP	1400	BRIEF
1800	FLY A/C		
2000	MOVIE		
2100	WENT TO ROOM READ AND SLEPT		
16 JUN 66			
0700	WOKE UP		
0730	MORNING MEAL		
0800-0930	BRIEF, SPARROW SHOOT		
1130	LAUNCH		
1530	PRIFLY	1530- 1550 ESCAPE PHASE	AIRCRAFT MALFUNCTION
1700	EVENING MEAL	1530-	
1830	BRIEF	1550	EJECTION NORMAL EXCEPT COULDN'T RELEASE LEFT ROCKET
2000	FLY A/C		JET FITTING. LINE CUT BY HELO CREW.
2200	Land		(b) (6) (c)
2230	MOVIE		
2315	SLEEP		
17 JUN 66			
0700	WOKE UP		
0730	MORNING MEAL		
0800	WORK IN SPACES		
1100	ATE FISH		

NON NO.	MODEL A/C	BUNO	TIME OF RESCUE
1-66	F4B	152976	IDENTIFICATION OF INDIVIDUAL B
NAME OF INDIVIDUAL			
(b) (6)	LITJG/USNR	(b) (6)	/1325 VF-84

MEDICAL OFFICER'S REPORT OF A/C ACCIDENT, INCIDENT, OR GROUND ACCIDENT - PAGE

OPNAV REPORT 3750-1

OPNAV FORM 3750-8C (REV. 3-63)

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED - See OPNAVINST 3750.6E for instructions.

SECTION F

PATHOLOGICAL DATA

(Refer to Section F of Instructions.)

1. INJURY CODE AND DISPOSITION

D G

3. UNCONSCIOUSNESS

 NO YES DURATION:

4. DROWNED

5. ASPHYXIATED

6. SHOCK

MILD

MODERATE

SEVERE

9. IF ADMITTED TO SICK LIST, GIVE DIAGNOSIS

(b) (6)

11. GROUNDED? IF YES, GIVE REASON

 NO YES

(b) (6)

13. PRIMARY CAUSE OF DEATH

N/A

15. AUTOPSY CONDUCTED BY:

 PATHOLOGIST, MEDICAL OFFICER PRESENT PATHOLOGIST, MEDICAL OFFICER NOT PRESENT MEDICAL OFFICER

16.

 PROTOCOL ATTACHED WILL BE FORWARDED

17. WAS "AUTOPSY MANUAL, NAVMED PS0085" USED?

 YES NO

N/A

18. IF NO AUTOPSY CONDUCTED, GIVE REASON

N/A

19.

INJURIES

PHASE SUSTAINED

A B S R

(b) (6)

X

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

X

UNK

(b) (6)

X

UNK

(b) (6)

X

(b) (6)

20. REMARKS

NONE

NO. 80.	MODEL A/C	BUNO	IDENTIFICATION OF INDIVIDUAL
---------	-----------	------	------------------------------

1-66

F4B

152976

B

NAME OF INDIVIDUAL

(b) (6)

LTJG/USNR

(b) (6)

/1325

VF-84

MEDICAL OFFICER'S REPORT OF A AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT, INCIDENT, OR GROUND ACCIDENT - PAGE 4A. OPNAV REPORT 3750.7

OPNAV FORM 3750-6D (REV. 5-68)


SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED. See OPNAV INST 3750.6E for Instructions

SECTION F (Continued)

SURFACE INJURIES

DESCRIBE AND SHOW GRAPHICALLY BY OUTLINING AND SHADING AFFECTED AREAS
ALL LACERATIONS, ABRASIONS, CONTUSIONS, PUNCTURE WOUNDS, SPRAINS AND BURNS
RECORD ALL INJURIES NO MATTER HOW TRIVIAL, WHETHER PATIENT LIVED OR DIED

(b) (6)



DETAILS OF SKULL FRACTURES AND BRAIN INJURY. DESCRIBE AND SHOW GRAPHICALLY.

1. ALL FRACTURES, BY TYPE (Simple, depressed, or indirect, etc.) 2. SITES OF BRAIN LESIONS, IF ANY 3. DISLOCATIONS OF MANDIBLE.



MRN NO.	MODEL A/C	BUNO	IDENTIFICATION OF INDIVIDUAL
1-66	F4B	152976	B

NAME OF INDIVIDUAL

(b) (6)

LT.JG/USNR

(b) (6)

/1325


VP-84

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SECTION F (Continued)

SKELETAL INJURIES

DESCRIBE AND SHOW GRAPHICALLY BY OUTLINING
ALL FRACTURES BY TYPE (Simple, compound, comminuted, etc.) AND DISLOCATIONS INDICATING DIRECTION OF DISPLACEMENT.



(b) (6)



DESCRIBE AND SHOW GRAPHICALLY: 1. ALL FRACTURES OF SPINAL COLUMN (Simple, compressed, etc.)
2. DISLOCATION AND DIRECTION OF DISPLACEMENT. 3. SITES OF CORD DAMAGE, IF ANY.

DETAILS OF SPINAL INJURIES

(b) (6)



BBR NO.	MODEL A/C	BUNS	IDENTIFICATION OF INDIVIDUAL
1-66	F4B	152976	B
GNAME OF INDIVIDUAL	LTJG/USNR	(b) (6)	1325 VF-B4

MEDICAL OFFICER'S REPORT OF AN ACCIDENT, INCIDENT, OR GROUND ACCIDENT - PAGE 5

OPNAV FORM 3750-BF (REV. 3-62)

OPNAV REPORT 3750-7
SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED. See OPNAVINST 3750AE for instructions.

SECTION G

ESCAPE, PERSONAL AND SURVIVAL EQUIPMENT

1. EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION INCLUDING SPECIFIC MODEL DESIGNATION	2. MODIFICATION	PHASE CODES:						
		3. RE- QUIRED	4. AVAIL- ABLE	5. NEED	6. USED	7. FAILED	8. A-ACCIDENT/MISHAP B-SURVIVAL	E-ESCAPE/EGRESS PHASE R-RESCUE PHASE
HAT, HARD	APH-5	YES	YES	YES	YES	NO		
SUIT, SUMMER FLYING		YES	YES	YES	YES	NO		
GLOVES, SUMMER								
FLYING		YES	YES	YES	YES	NO		
BOOTS, FLIGHT	Z-3	YES	YES	YES	YES	NO		
"G" SUIT, ANTI		YES	YES	YES	YES	NO		
VEST, LIFE	MK-3	YES	YES	YES	YES	NO		
FLARES, DAY, NIGHT		YES	YES	YES	NO	NO		
GUN, FLARE		YES	YES	YES	NO	NO		

SECTION H

NARRATIVE OF ESCAPE/EGRESS, SURVIVAL AND RESCUE PHASES

SEE ENCLOSURE (3) PAGE (2)

MDR NO.	MODEL A/C	BUNO	IDENTIFICATION OF INDIVIDUAL	
1-66	F4B	152976	B	
NAME OF INDIVIDUAL				
(b) (6)	LT.JG/USNR	(b) (6)	/1325	VP-84
OP-057				

MEDICAL OFFICER'S REPORT OF AIR ACCIDENT, INCIDENT, OR GROUND ACCIDENT - PAGE 6

OPNAV FORM 3750-8G (REV. 3-63) OPNAV REPORT 3750-7
SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED. See OPNAV INST 3750.8E FOR INSTRUCTIONS

SECTION I

1. TOPOGRAPHY OF INDIVIDUAL'S LANDING SITE

WATER LAND OTHER

2. TYPE OF EGRESS

EJECTION BAILOUT UNDERWATER NORMAL OTHER (Specify type)

S	E	REMARKS
	3. NOT ATTEMPTED	
X	4. ATTEMPTED	
X	5. ACCOMPLISHED	
	6. THRU CANOPY	
X	7. PRIOR TO EGRESS	
	8. DURING EGRESS	
	9. SUBSEQUENT TO EGRESS	

10. GIVE TYPE AND MODEL OF EJECTION SEAT USED

MARTIN BAKER MKH5A/1

11. METHOD OF FIRING SEAT

PRIMARY SECONDARY OTHER

12. SEQUENCE OF EJECTION

NORMAL (FIRST)

13. POSITION OF SEAT ON EJECTION	14. ATTITUDE OR MANEUVER OF A/C AT EXIT	15. AIRSPEED
<input type="checkbox"/> UP <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> DOWN <input type="checkbox"/> FORWARD <input type="checkbox"/> AFT <input type="checkbox"/> OTHER	LEVEL	230 KNOTS
16. ALTITUDE AT TIME OF EXIT (FEET)	17. ALTITUDE OF PARACHUTE OPENING	18. WEIGHT
ABOVE SEA LEVEL 1200'	ABOVE TOPOGRAPHY 1200'	200 POUNDS
19. TIME IN WATER	20. TIME IN RAFT	21. WAVE HEIGHT
5 MIN	0 MIN	3'
22. WAVE INTERVAL	23. AIR TEMPERATURE	24. VISIBILITY
3 SECONDS	84°	10 MILES
25. ALERTING FACTORS	26.	27.
VISUAL SIGHT FROM THE USS INDEPENDENCE CVA-62. PLANES IN THE AIR.	80.	81.
SAME AS ABOVE	82.	83.
SAME AS ABOVE	84.	85.

26. DID INDIVIDUAL DEPART FROM LANDING SITE?

(If Yes, Explain reason and sequence up to rescue)

NO YES

SECTION J

1. DATE OF LAST TRAINING

LPC 17 MAR 66 EJECTION TOWER 17 MAR 66 EJECTION SEAT 17 MAR 66 SURVIVAL 20 MAR 64

2. DID THE LACK OF TRAINING AND/OR EXPERIENCE PLAY A PART IN ANY PHASE OF THIS MISCHAP (If yes, explain)

NO YES

MOS NO. 1-66	MODEL A/C F4B	BUNO 152976	IDENTIFICATION OF INDIVIDUAL B
(b) (6)		LTJG/USNR	(b) (6) 1325 VF-84

V. THE ACCIDENT

BuNo 152976, MOHIX No. 206, was one of four aircraft assigned to the 1530 launch from USS INDEPENDENCE with a mission of conventional weapons delivery on the Vieques impact area (enclosure 8). The aircraft was preflighted by a qualified Plane Captain (enclosure 6). Aircraft 206 was armed with six MK 86 practice bombs 3 each carried on TCRs mounted on Stations 1 and 9. In addition LAU 17s were mounted on Stations 2 and 8 and a 600 gallon centerline on Station 5 (enclosure 4). Launch weight was 47,000 lbs (enclosure 7a). A pre-flight brief was conducted by the flight leader in accordance with the NATOPS briefing guide. The briefing commenced one and one half hours prior to scheduled launch time. LCDR (b) (6) and LTJG (b) (6) attended the entire brief and manned 206 when directed by Air Operations one half hour prior to launch. Both the pilot and the RIO performed a NATOPS pre-flight inspection of 206. Fifteen minutes was available to perform the pre-flight inspection, check ordnance loads, and strap in prior to the call for starting engines. NATOPS pre-start, start, start, before taxi and pre-takeoff procedures were utilized. The challenge and reply method was used to complete the takeoff check list prior to taxiing over the shuttle in preparation for launch from Catapult #3. When given the tension-up signal the pilot advanced power to 80% on both engines and the aircraft was given an external check by the line trouble-shooter (enclosure 6). Upon signal from the catapult officer the pilot advanced power to military, checked the engines gauges which he determined to be indicating within the normal range, and advanced the power to maximum afterburner as he felt the initial acceleration of the catapult stroke. The catapult stroke was normal and after launch rotation and clearing turn were executed smoothly and smartly. No object was seen to strike the aircraft or fall from it during the launch phase (enclosure 7a). The landing gear was retracted when airborne at a speed of approximately 165 KIAS, and the flaps commenced retraction following the execution of a port clearing turn. The following events are depicted spatially in enclosure (9). Upon completion of flap retraction the pilot noted illumination of the port engine Fire Warning light and reported it to the RIO who checked all circuit breakers in, checked visually aft of the aircraft for indication of trailing smoke, and upon rechecking the circuit breakers observed that the stabilator trim indicator circuit breaker was popped. As the RIO was rechecking the circuit breakers and resetting the popped circuit breaker which stayed in, the pilot deselected afterburner, commenced wing dump, and retarded the port throttle to idle. The port fire warning light went out approximately 10 seconds after the port engine reached idle RPM. Wing dump was secured. An estimated 30 seconds later at 500 feet and 230 KIAS the starboard fire warning light illuminated. Power was reduced to approximately 85% in the starboard engine and advanced to 85% on the port engine. Almost immediately the port fire warning light reilluminated. (The force required to move the throttles was considerable higher than normal and once set, further attempts to move them proved futile). Within 5 seconds a thump was heard by both crewmen followed almost immediatley by illumination of the Flashing Wheels warning light. The light went out within an estimated 5 seconds. The pilot and RIO searched for but could discover no indications of fire in either cockpit. Several circuit breakers began popping on circuit breaker panel #1 rows B and C from #3 down. None would reset. Approximately 30 seconds later both generators failed almost simultaneously. Electrical power was regained by

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARAGRAPH 66, OPNAVINST P3750.6E

Ram Air Turbine extension and turning both generators to off and all external stores were jettisoned by actuation of the External Stores Emergency Release button. Altitude was increased to 1200 feet and airspeed to 230 KIAS. About 60 seconds later most all the circuit breakers in the rear cockpit began popping and would not reset. Indication of fire in the area aft of the trailing edge of the port wing root was observed by the airborne flight leader and ships' personnel (enclosure 6). The pilot indicated the possibility of ejection to the RIO. The RIO ejected. After hearing the RIO's seat fire the pilot noted port engine fuel flow increase to 8-9000 pph then slowly decreased to below 3000 pph, the EGT climbed to 1000° then drop below 600°, and RPM climb to in excess of 101% then begin to decrease. The port engine was secured with the engine master switch and the pilot ejected. The aircraft descended without unusual agitation, impacted the water nose down, and sank immediately. Both RIO and pilot's ejection seats functioned normally and all survival equipment operated satisfactorily except that the pilot's seat pan retaining straps broke during the opening shock of the parachute. Crewmembers were picked from the water by UH-2A using rescue seat. (enclosure 2)

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARAGRAPH 66, OPNAVINST P3750.6E

Statement of LCDR (b) (6)

USN, (b) (6)

concerning CO, VF-84

ser 1-66A, 17 June 1966, F-4B BuNo 152976, Pilot (b) (6)

The briefing for this flight commenced at 1400. LCDR (b) (6) was the flight leader and I was number four in the flight of four scheduled for a CAS mission using MK-76 and MK-86 practice bombs. The briefing was thorough and in accordance with NATOPS in all respects. We left the ready room at 1500 to man aircraft for the 1530 launch.

My RO and I conducted a thorough pre-flight of the aircraft and no discrepancies were found. The aircraft was configured with a centerline tank, two LAU 17 pylons on the inboard wing stations and MK-86's on TERS on the out-board stations.

A complete pre-start cockpit check was conducted after the aircraft was manned. When external power was connected, the ICS check was made with the RO and the eject light checked. Cold mike was selected for the start. Number two engine was started first. The fire warning lights and warning lights were checked as number 2 engine RPM increased to 10% for the start. The hook handle and gear handle lights were both inoperative and a note was made on my knee board. All other cockpit checks were normal. The start of both number 2 and number 1 engines were normal. Aircraft electrical power was selected and the stabilizer checked after number 2 had come up to idle.

External power was disconnected after the start. The starboard generator was turned off, the bus tie light checked, and the generator turned back on. The fact that both generators were on the line and the bus tie light was out was reported to the RO. Checks of the hook, speed brakes, flaps, ELC and inflight refueling probe were conducted as directed by the plane captain. After the checks, the airplane was considered in an up status and we prepared for the launch. The take-off check list was covered in the spot, which was all the way aft on the flight deck. Before leaving the spot we had wings, flaps and compass to go before completing the check list.

The aircraft was taxied forward to the number 3 catapult and was the first F4 of the flight to launch. Prior to reaching the catapult the wings were spread, the flaps lowered to full down and the compass was aligned. After the nose strut was extended on the catapult the AJB-3 gyro was set level. On the tension signal, power was added to 80% and all instruments were checked and were normal. A check was made with the RO to see if he was ready to launch, which he was.

Control was passed to the catapult officer and I went to 100% on the five finger signal. After the engine instruments had stabilized at 100% the throttles were moved into the AB range until an indication that both afterburners had lit was noted. Both throttles were then moved to the minimum afterburner detent. I saluted and the aircraft was launched. Full afterburner was selected during the launch.

Immediately after launch, the gear was raised at 165 knots and a clearing turn to port commenced. I reported the gear up to the RO. The flaps were then retracted and a starboard turn was commenced to parallel the fox corpen. I reported "flaps coming up" to the RO.

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARAGRAPH 66, OPNAVINST P3750.4E

The aircraft was steadied up on the fox corpen heading. At this time I noted that the port fire warning light was on. I reported to the RO that we had a port fire warning light, deselected afterburner on both engines, opened the wing dump valve and commenced a turn to port to stay close to the ship. Power on the port engine was then retarded to idle. I told the RO that the light was still on and to call the ship. He said that he had had a circuit breaker out but was able to reset it. I then called the ship and reported that we had a port fire warning light. Shortly after that transmission the port fire warning light went out. I told the RO the light was out and secured the dump valve assuming that it would be possible to stay airborne until the next recovery. The ship was advised that both lights were out and all instruments were normal. The starboard fire warning light came on only a few seconds later. I opened the dump valve and reported the starboard light to the RO. Altitude at this point was approximately 500 feet and the airspeed was approximately 230 knots. Our position was approximately 300° relative to the ship.

We began to lose altitude and the airspeed dropped to 190 knots. Power was reduced to 85% on the starboard engine and advanced to 85% on the port engine. The fire warning light on the port engine came on almost immediately. The throttles had become increasingly difficult to move up to this point and I assumed they froze since further throttle movement was not possible during the flight. A thump was felt which I thought was the gear extending, however a check of the landing gear indicators showed all gear in the up position. A flashing wheels light was noted at this time. The light went out within a short time. Altitude was increasing and airspeed was up to 220 knots as we passed abeam the ship on the port side at about two miles. The RO mentioned that he had no indication of a fire in the rear cockpit. We were still in a port turn. I checked the rearview mirrors for smoke. There was no smoke but fuel was still dumping from the port dump mast. I commented to the RO that we were not trailing smoke.

Passing about 225° relative to the ship I transmitted to the ship that we were coming up astern at 1200 feet and had both fire warning lights. All electrical power failed after the transmission. The RAT was extended and both generators were turned off. ICS was regained and the RO asked if the RAT was out. I said "affirmative" and told him I was jettisoning the external stores. At this time I pushed the External Stores Emergency Release button. I did not feel the stores leave the aircraft but could see where they had impacted in the water aft of the ship.

We continued up the starboard side of the ship at 1200 feet and 230 knots. Passing abeam I attempted one transmission on the UHF but received no acknowledgment. The RO reported he now had several circuit breakers out which he could not reset. Crossing in front of the ship, the RO reported that most of the circuit breakers had popped and he was unable to reset any of them. I made the decision to eject at this point and told the RO "It looks like we are going to have to get out" so he could prepare himself. He replied, "Roger, I'm going now", and ejected.

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARAGRAPH 66, OPNAVINST P3750.6E

After the RO ejected, I checked the instruments for some indication that the situation had improved. I noted the fuel flow on the port engine increase to 8-9000 pounds per hour, EGT exceed 1000° and RPM exceed 101%. Fuel flow then dropped below 3000 pounds per hour, EGT dropped below 600° and RPM began to decrease. I secured the port engine master switch.

Although engine instruments had been normal to this point and no smoke could be seen in the rearview mirrors, the possibility of a bad internal fire became readily apparent and I ejected.

The ejection was without incident. I heard the canopy leave the aircraft and was surprised at the acceleration from the seat, not expecting it to be so high. I heard the drogue gun fire and felt a turning motion after the seat left the aircraft. I released the face curtain and felt the opening shock of the chute almost immediately. The opening shock was hard and it caused the retaining straps on the seat pan to break and allow the seat pan to slide down below my knees. I checked the chute, it was fully deployed and the rod from the drogue gun was hanging over the canopy just a few feet from my head. I noticed that the aircraft had gone in behind me and to my left. I removed the oxygen mask, raised the seat pan to waist level and deployed the seat pan contents.

The raft and attached equipment fell out below me. I then released the starboard connection on the seat pan.

Impact with the water was hard. I was drifting backwards and landed feet first but then went down on my back hard. Both sides of the MK-3 were inflated and the parachute was released. As I released the right KOCH fitting first, I checked the chute and saw that it had completely collapsed. I drifted into the chute after it was released. In trying to swim away from it my feet became entangled in the shroud lines. A survival knife was used to cut the shroud lines and I was able to move away from the chute. The helicopter was hovering at this time with the rescue hook in the water. I released the seat pan and swam the few feet to the hook. Entry into helicopter was without incident.

Cockpit indications during this emergency were very confusing. Normal instrument readings with both fire warning lights on and the absence of trailing smoke made it difficult to determine that there was a fire or extreme overheat condition and not a faulty fire warning system. Loss of electrical power and the popped circuit breakers did confirm the seriousness of the situation. Cause of the electrical failure could not be understood at the time however. I strongly recommend that this type of emergency be covered in the NATOPS Manual thoroughly so that pilots will be aware of the possibility of an overheat condition if the generators are lost, radios are lost or circuit breakers cannot be reset.

I have been a designated naval aviator for nine years and have 2742 hours of flying time.

(b) (6)

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARAGRAPH 66, OPNAVINST P3750.6E

ENCLOSURE 1 TO CO, VF-84 AAR SER 1-66A

We briefed at 1400 for a bombing hop. Four aircraft were to be in one flight. At 1445 I climbed into my flight gear. At 1500 we manned aircraft for a 1530 takeoff. After a normal preflight, we manned aircraft. The start was normal and we went through the takeoff check list by challenge and answer without a hitch. I verbally acknowledged that both transformer rectifiers were on the line and all circuits breakers in. Right after the clearing turn (b) reported raising the gear and flaps and then a port fire warning light. I did not reply but rechecked the circuit breakers, all of which were still in. I looked behind me for any indication of fire but saw none. He again reported a port fire warning light and this time I saw a circuit breaker popped. I reset it, acknowledged the warning light and told him about the reset circuit breaker. It was the stab. posit. ind. circuit breaker.

I saw the dumps on in the rearview mirror, but no smoke or flames. We were turning downwind and (b) reported he couldn't maintain power to me and then called departure to report a fire warning light. He then reported lights out, indicators normal and told departure the same. Then he reported to me a starboard fire warning light and a few seconds later he said the port had come on again. I heard a thump and I again looked aft for indications of fire but still saw nothing unusual. I looked back at the circuit breaker panel and noticed a second group of circuit breakers out. There were about six to eight on panel one at the second and third column and extending from the second row down to about the fourth or fifth. There were also two isolated circuit breakers popped on panel two. I tried to reset the ones on panel one, but they stayed in only long as I held pressure on them. Departure told us to go to button two (the tower). I tried to acknowledge, but just then we had a total electrical failure. I positioned myself for possible ejection. I saw the RAT come out and the ICS came back on. I asked (b) whether he had thrown out the RAT although I still don't know why I asked. He said he had and that he was jettisoning the external stores. I asked whether he was getting rid of the centerline too. He said he was.

I was hoping we might get aboard since we were just approaching astern the ship, but there were still three to five aircraft on the fantail. I told (b) about the second group of circuit breakers and that I couldn't reset them. I tried to contact the tower but there was no response although I thought I heard the side tone of our transmitter. As we came past the starboard beam almost all the circuit breakers started popping randomly and singly. I was trying to reset them with both hands, but they would stay in only as long as I applied pressure. I again tried feeling the bulkheads for unusual heat, but I still could feel nothing extremely hot. I sat up and tried to look behind us for smoke or flames. I repeated to (b) several times during this period that the circuit breakers were popping and could not be reset.

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARAGRAPH 66, OPNAVINST P3750.6E

(b) said "It looks like we'll have to get out", I said "Roger, I'm going", pushed my hips and shoulders in, my feet forward, looked at my palms and pulled. When I realized I was in my parachute, I released my mask, right Sierra fitting then left, pulled the apple and let my mask drop away (I thought). I released my seat pack and saw my raft stream below me. I felt for my KOCH fitting which were about 9 inches above my shoulder then pulled my hands away lest I release them inadvertently, I threw away my gloves and when I thought I was about to hit, I reached for my KOCH fittings again. I planed my body when I hit the water and released both fittings without any trouble. I inflated my MK3C and sort of dog paddled over to the raft. My mask had remained connected to me because of my G-suit fitting and extension hose and began fouling around my left leg and the raft line. When I realized what had happened I pulled the quick release fitting, untangled my mask and discarded it.

I did not climb in because (b) (6) and I knew the helo would be there any second and then I would only have to get out of it again. So I held onto the skinny side. When I saw the helo approaching, I did a modified back paddle to the hook, grabbed it with my left hand and released the right rocket jet fitting. I swung both legs onto the hook, transferred hands and tried to release the left fitting but it wouldn't give. The helo crew began to lift me out of the water and I signaled to let me down again. This time I put my right hand on the springs, my left on the sliding assembly, but it still wouldn't release. The helo tried to lift me again and again I signaled to be lowered. This time I pulled in on the raft line for slack, wrapped my left hand under it to hold the slack, put my left hand on the sliding assembly, my right on the springs and again tried to release the left rocket jet fitting with no luck. I pulled out my survival knife, made a futile gesture at cutting the scott kit away. The helo crew lifted me all the way up, cut me loose and pulled me in.

I was designated a Naval Flight Officer on 24 June 1964 and I have 700 hours in the F4.

(b) (6)

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARAGRAPH 66, OPNAVINST 3750.6E

CONCLUSIONS


1. THE CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT IS UNDETERMINED.
2. THE POSSIBLE CAUSES OF THE ACCIDENT WERE MATERIAL FAILURE AND OR IMPROPER INSTALLATION OF EQUIPMENT.

8
8

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. CONTINUED EMPHASIS SHOULD BE PLACED ON QUALITY CONTROL WITH RESPECT TO THE PROPER FABRICATION AND INSTALLATION OF ALL EQUIPMENT.

(b) (6)



LT MC USNR

6 SPECIAL HANDLING IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARA 66, OPNAVINST P3750.6E

ENCLOSURE (4)

RESCUE REPORT OPMAR FORM 3750-13
(ORIGINAL ONLY)

RESCUE REPORT

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 50-6E
OPNAV FORM 3750-13 (3-63) Stock No. I-0107-603-7230 INSTRUCTIONS: SEE REVERSE

OPNAV REPORT SYMBOL 3750-14

1. FROM HELSUPPRON TWO (HC-2), DET. 62			2. DATE OF MISHAP 17 JUN 1966	3. DATE OF RESCUE 17 JUN 1966
3. LOCATION AND DUTIES OF RESCUE VEHICLE U.S.S. INDEPENDENCE CVA-62, PLANE GUARD HELOS			4. RESCUE VEHICLE (Type/Model) TWO UH-2A	
5. NUMBER OF PERSONNEL	SA. IN RESCUE VEHICLE OR ON RESCUE TEAM 6	SB. TO BE RESCUED 2	SC. RESCUED 2	SD. RESCUE BACK UP MEANS UH-2A
7. TIME SEQUENCE OF EVENTS (Local Date Time Group)			8. WEATHER CONDITIONS AT RESCUE SITE	
7A. Alert Received	Method 1538Q UHF RADIO, VISUAL SIGHTING		8A. WATER TEMPERATURE 84 °F	8B. AIR TEMPERATURE 84 °F
7B. Vehicle Deployed	Stationed to Scene 1538Q THREE MILES		8C. WIND VELOCITY 090/24	
7C. Arrived on Scene	Search Required 1540Q NONE		8D. SEA STATE/WAVE HEIGHT/FREQUENCY; TERRAIN DESCRIPTION SLIGHT / 3 FEET / 3 SECONDS	
7D. Located Survivors	Method of Locating 1540Q VISUAL SIGHTING OF PARACHUTES		8E. EQUIPMENTS ACTUALLY USED DURING RESCUE	
7E. Began Retrieval	What Was Sighted First 1541Q MEN FLOATING IN WATER ALONGSIDE RAPTOR		PORKED SEAT	
7F. Ended Retrieval	Subsequently 1544Q			
7G. Survivor(s) Disembarked	Location (If different from Item 3) 1548Q			

10. DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED (List all difficulties and effect on final success of rescue attempt. i.e., ALERTING PERIOD, SEARCH/LOCATING,

FISH POLE BOOM ON HELO #12 (149032) WOULD NOT OPERATE DUE TO PARTIALLY HUNG-UP PORT GEAR. USED REGULAR HOIST BOOM AND ENCOUNTERED NO DIFFICULTIES.

11. PERSONNEL REQUIRING RESCUE NAME-LAST FIRST INITIAL	GIVE REASON FOR RESCUE	FACTORS COMPLICATING RESCUE ATTEMPT Physical condition, ignorance of equipment, familiarity, etc.
(b) (6)	EJECTED FROM F-4B	NONE
(b) (6)	EJECTED FROM F-4B	MAN COULD NOT GET SEAT PACK TO SEPERATE FROM HARNESS

12. REMARKS: (Training of rescue teams or crews, communication equipments/techniques, retrieval equipments/techniques, rescue vehicle)

- 1) NORMAL SQUADRON TRAINING FOR PILOTS AND CREWMEN
- 2) COULD POSSIBLY MARK LIFERAFTS AFTER RESCUE WITH DYE MARKER OR SMOKE FLOAT TO FACILITATE EASIER LOCATION BY FOLLOW-UP UNITS.

13. ATTACH ENCLOSURES: Narratives of search, location and retrieving—Survivor's statements

14. NAME AND TITLE OF SIGNING OFFICIAL

(b) (6) LT, USNR, DET ASST OPS OFF.

(b) (6)

15. NAME AND TITLE OF FORWARDING OFFICIAL

(b) (6) LCDR, USNR, DET OINC

(b) (6)

ENCLOSURE 2 TO OO, VP-84 AAR SER 1-66A

PLATE NO. 14735

On 17 June 1966 while flying plane guard for the U.S.S. INDEPENDENCE in ANGEL #12, BUNO 149032, with LT. (b) (6) as co-pilot, we received word over UHF tower frequency at 1538 Q that there was a multiple ejection forward of the port bow. ANGEL #25, BUNO 149753, with LTJO (b) (6) and LCDR (b) (6), were flying second plane guard approximately a mile behind us. We were at the time of the ejection notice, nearing the stern of the carrier headed upwind. As soon as we heard the message I cut under the stern of the carrier while LT. (b) (6) dumped fuel until we had approximately 800-900 pounds left. I headed out off the carrier's bow and it was then I noticed a parachute coming down approximately two miles ahead and slightly to the left. The crewmen were rigging the forked seat at this time while my co-pilot kept his eye on the man in the water. I descended to approximately 80 feet and 60 knots. At approximately one-half mile I descended to about 40 feet and about 20 knots. We heard ANGEL #25 heading for the second chute astern of us. We arrived over the man hovering at 20 feet and I noticed the man still had his chute on and was hanging on to his liferaft. He left his raft and swam toward the seat. At this time I was hovering over the man while (b) (6), ADR2, gave me hovering instructions. (b) (6) hoisted him about 5-6 feet and noticed that the man still had his seat pack and liferaft attached to his harness. (b) (6) advised the man to get rid of these and lowered the man back into the water. The man had difficulty freeing himself and (b) (6) raised him up a foot or so out of the water. The man still could not free himself so (b) (6) hoisted him up and cut the seat pack and liferaft away with his survival knife. The pack and liferaft dropped into the water. The rescued man said he was all right except his (b) (6) just a little. We then started back to the ship and flew behind ANGEL #25 for a landing at the carrier. We landed and discharged our rescued man aircraft.

Approaching the man in the water we tried to rig the fish pole boom, but it wouldn't swing out due to partially non-retracted port gear. The hoist boom was used with no difficulty. We were sent later to try and find the liferaft and would have been aided by dye marker or smoke float and it might be a good point to note on future rescues.

Weather was clear, wind about 20-25 knots from the East. Sea state was 2 with 4-5 feet swells and 3-4 seconds apart. Outside air temperature was +28°C.

I figure that about 1541 Q we were over the man and hovered about three minutes and arrived at the ship at 1547 Q. Total time from notification until arrival back at the carrier was about nine minutes.

(b) (6)

STATEMENT OF (b) (6)

ADR2, Concerning Rescue of 17 JUN 1966

While flying plane guard in the general area of the ship, I heard the emergency signal from an aircraft in the area. We received directions of two deployed chutes off the port bow. We proceeded to the general area and later we were in a hover over the man. I rigged the rescue hoist with seat on the way in on the approach and the seat was about half way down when we arrived. I then put the seat into the water and the pilot got aboard. I then lifted him out of the water and observed that he still had his seatpack attached to his harness and his liferaft lanyard was attached to his seat pack. I instructed him to release his seatpack and he told me "Ok" and to put him back into the water. I put him back into the water, but he had difficulty reaching it with both hands due to his Mae West. He worked for awhile on it and then decided to cut it off. He drew his knife and still could not reach it. During this time he was about shoulder high in the water and was getting white caps over his helmet. I brought him up about 4-5 feet above the swells. He then tried to reach his seatpack to cut it and couldn't so he punctured his Mae West with his knife. He still couldn't reach it so I asked to bring him up into the aircraft and cut it myself. I was told OK. I brought him up to the side of the aircraft and drew my knife and cut the remaining strap to his seatpack. In doing so it fell into the water. I then brought him into the aircraft and secured the rescue gear and we returned to the ship. I asked him if he was all right and he stated his

(b) (6) but he was all right.

(b) (5)

(b) (5)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

ADR2 USN

STATEMENT OF LTJG (b) (6), CONCERNING RESCUE OF 17 JUN 1966

On 17 June 1966 at approximately 1540 Q, I was flying in Halo #25 in plane guard position with Halo #12. My co-pilot was LCDR (b) (6) crewmen were (b) (6) ADJB, and (b) (6) ATG. A call came over the air that there [REDACTED] was a plane in the water, port side of the ship. Halo #12 immediately crossed over the wake, I was about one-half mile behind. I started dumping fuel, from about 1700 pounds down to around 1000 pounds. Halo #12 was heading for a chute in the air when I saw another chute about two miles aft of the first one and I headed for it. Once the chute got into the water I lost sight of him, but LCDR (b) (6) caught sight of him again as we got closer. Approach into the wind (about 20 knots) was routine and we hovered over the man in the water waiting for him to get out of his chute. Maintaining a good position over the man was a little difficult since I couldn't see him, but (b) (6) talked to me and kept me in position. The pick-up and return to the ship were routine.

(b) (5)

[REDACTED]

(b) (6)

[REDACTED]

(b) (6)

LTCR USNR

STATEMENT OF (b) (6)

ADJ3, Concerning Rescue of 17 JUN 1966

Approximately five minutes after we had assumed plane guard position, we received a call from the tower advising us that two pilots were ejecting off the port beam. We proceeded to the area of the downed pilots and spotted one parachute still airborne. The pilots of Halo #12 proceeded to pick up the man that was still airborne. We then went to the area where the plane hit the water and spotted the pilot approximately two hundred yards aft of the impact area. I then directed the pilot, LT JC (b) (6), to the downed pilot. The pilot was cutting his parachute shroud lines when we pulled into a hover above him. As soon as he cut himself free, he swam to the rescue seat, and I hoisted him aboard. I asked him if he was all right and he said he was; so I then gave him a drink of water and offered him a cigarette. He said "no thanks" to the offer of a smoke. We then returned to the carrier and discharged our downed pilot and returned to the plane guard position.

Due to calm seas and co-operation of all involved the rescue was performed without difficulty and was mostly routine.

When we arrived at the rescue scene I noticed that the pilot had removed his hard hat.

(b) (6)

ADJ3

(b) (6)

We continued up the starboard side of the ship at 1200 feet and 230 knots. Passing abeam I attempted one transmission on the UHF but received no acknowledgement. The RO reported he now had several circuit breakers out which he could not reset. Crossing in front of the ship, the RO reported that most of the circuit breakers had popped and was unable to reset any of them. I made the decision to eject at this point and told the RO "it looks like we are going to have to get out" so that he could prepare himself. He replied "Roger, I'm going now" and ejected.

After the RO ejected, I checked the instruments for some indication that the situation had improved. I noted the fuel flow on the port engine increase to 8-9000 pounds per hour, EGT exceed 1000°, and RPM exceed 101%. Fuel flow then dropped below 3000 pounds per hour, EGT dropped below 600° and RPM began to decrease. I secured the port engine master switch. Although engine instruments had been normal to this point and no smoke could be seen in the rear view mirrors, the possibility of a bad internal fire became readily apparent and I ejected.

The ejection was without incident. I heard the canopy leave the aircraft and was surprised at the acceleration from the seat, not expecting it to be so high. I heard the drogue gun fire and felt a turning motion after the seat left the aircraft. I released the face curtain and felt the opening shock of the chute almost immediately. The opening shock of the chute was hard and it caused the retaining straps on my harness to break and allow the seat pan to slide below my knees. I checked the chute, it was fully deployed and the rod from the drogue gun was hanging over the canopy just a few feet from my head. I noticed that the aircraft had gone in behind me and to the left. I removed the oxygen mask, raised the seat pan to waist level and deployed the seat pan contents. The raft and attached equipment fell out below me. I then released the starboard connection on the seat pan.

Impact with the water was hard. I was drifting backwards and landed feet first but then went down on my back hard. Both sides of the HK-3 were inflated and the parachute was released. As I released the right Koch fitting first I checked the chute and saw it had completely collapsed. I drifted into the chute after it was released. In trying to swim away from it my feet became entangled in the shroud lines. A survival knife was used to cut the shroud lines and I was able to move away from the chute. The helicopter was hovering at this time with the rescue hook in the water. I released the seat pan and swam the few feet to the hook. Entry into the ~~xxxxxx~~ helicopter was without incident.

I have been a designated naval aviator for nine years and have 2742 hours of flying time.

As we came past the starboard beam of the ship almost all the circuit breakers started popping randomly and singly. I was trying to reset them with both hands, but they would stay in only as long as I applied pressure. I again tried feeling the bulkheads for unusual heat, but I still couldn't feel any extreme heat. I sat up and tried to look behind us for smoke or flames. I repeated to (b) several times during this period that the circuit breakers were popping and could not be set again. (b) (6) said "it looks like we'll have to get out". I said "roger, I'm going", pushed my hips and shoulders in, my parachute, I released my mask, right Sierra fitting then left, pulled the apple and let my mask drop away (I thought). I released my seat pack and saw my raft stream below me. I felt for my Koch fittings which were about 9 inches above my shoulder then pulled my hands away lest I release them inadvertently. I threw away my gloves and when I thought I was about to hit, I reached my Koch fittings again. I planed my body when I hit the water and released both fittings without any trouble. I inflated my MK-3C and sort of dog paddled over to the raft. My mask had remained connected to me because of my G-suit fitting and extension hose and began fouling around my left leg and raft line. When I realized what had happened I pulled the quick release fitting, untangled my mask and discarded it. I did not climb in because my (b) (6) (b) (6) and I knew the halo would be there any second and then I would only have to get out of it again. So I held onto the skinny side. When I saw the halo approaching, I did a modified back paddle to the hook, grabbed it with my left hand and released the right rocket jet fitting. I swung both legs onto the hook, transferred hands and tried to release the left fitting but it wouldn't give. The halo crew began to lift me out of the water and I signalled to let me down again. This time I put my right hand on the springs, my left on the sliding assembly, but it still wouldn't release. The halo tried to lift me again and again I signalled to be lowered. This time I pulled in on the raft line for slack, wrapped my left hand under it to hold the slack, put my left hand on the sliding assembly, my right on the springs and again tried to release the left rocket jet fitting with no luck. I pulled out my survival knife, made a futile gesture at cutting the scott kit away. The halo crew lifted me all the way up, cut me loose and pulled me in.

I was designated an Naval Flight Officer on 24 June 1964 and I have 700 hours in the F-4.

(b) (6)

LTJC USN

Statement of LCDR (b) (6), USN, (b) (6), concerning CO, VF-84
Ser 1-66A, 17 June 1966 F-4B BUNO 152976, Pilot (b) (6)

F4B Bureau Number 152976 was accepted for fleet delivery on 22 February 1966 and had flown a total of 124.6 hours. An acceptance inspection was completed by VF-84 on 2 March 1966. This inspection included a high power turn-up with the engine bays open and a visual QC inspection of all accessible fuel, bleed air and hydraulic lines.

The engines (Port Serial Number 421868, Starboard Serial Number 421869) were installed at the plant and had a total of 134.0 hours.

On 17 June 1966 the aircraft was preflighted by a qualified Plane Captain and all applicable Maintenance Requirement Cards were complied with. The aircraft was considered ready for flight in all respects.

The following list contains all discrepancies noted in the previous ten flights:

<u>DATE</u>	<u>TIME OF FLIGHT</u>	<u>DISCREPANCY</u>	<u>CORRECTIVE ACTION</u>
6-7-66	.6	None	
6-8-66	2.0	Replace light in BDHI rear cockpit	
6-8-66	.5	None	
6-9-66	1.2	None	
6-14-66	1.7	Nozzle position indicator circuit breaker will not reset	Replaced impingement start switch
6-16-66	1.6	None	
6-16-66	1.6	None	
6-16-66	1.2	None	
6-17-66	1.7	None	
6-17-66	1.7	None	

On 20 April 1966 the Right Hand Inboard Transfer and Low Level Shut-Off Valve (Fig.3, Item-36, NAVWEPS 01-245-FDA-4-5) was replaced to correct a transfer malfunction. The installation was leak checked and the malfunction corrected. This was the only discrepancy since receipt of BUNO 152976 involving fuel or bleed air integrity.

I have been a designated Naval Aviator for ten years and have 2700 flight hours with 1300 in the F4B.

(b) (6)

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARAGRAPH 66, OPNAVINST P3750.6E

ENCLOSURE 3 TO CO, VF-84, AAR SER 1-66A

Statement of LCDR [REDACTED] (b) (6)

USN, [REDACTED] (b) (6)

ser 1-66A, 17 June 1966, F-4B BuNo 152976, Pilot [REDACTED] (b) (6) concerning CO, VF-84

The briefing for this flight commenced at 1400. LCDR [REDACTED] (b) (6) was the flight leader and I was number four in the flight of four scheduled for a CAS mission using MK-76 and MK-86 practice bombs. The briefing was thorough and in accordance with NATOPS in all respects. We left the ready room at 1500 to man aircraft for the 1530 launch.

My RO and I conducted a thorough pre-flight of the aircraft and no discrepancies were found. The aircraft was configured with a centerline tank, two LAU 17 pylons on the inboard wing stations and MK-86's on TERS on the out-board stations.

A complete pre-start cockpit check was conducted after the aircraft was manned. When external power was connected, the ICS check was made with the RO and the eject light checked. Cold mike was selected for the start. Number two engine was started first. The fire warning lights and warning lights were checked as number 2 engine RPM increased to 10% for the start. The hook handle and gear handle lights were both inoperative and a note was made on my knee board. All other cockpit checks were normal. The start of both number 2 and number 1 engines were normal. Aircraft electrical power was selected and the stabilizer checked after number 2 had come up to idle.

External power was disconnected after the start. The starboard generator was turned off, the bus tie light checked, and the generator turned back on. The fact that both generators were on the line and the bus tie light was out was reported to the RO. Checks of the hook, speed brakes, flaps, ELC and inflight refueling probe were conducted as directed by the plane captain. After the checks, the airplane was considered in an up status and we prepared for the launch. The take-off check list was covered in the spot, which was all the way aft on the flight deck. Before leaving the spot we had wings, flaps and compass to go before completing the check list.

The aircraft was taxied forward to the number 3 catapult and was the first F4 of the flight to launch. Prior to reaching the catapult the wings were spread, the flaps lowered to full down and the compass was aligned. After the nose strut was extended on the catapult the AJB-3 gyro was set level. On the tension signal, power was added to 80% and all instruments were checked and were normal. A check was made with the RO to see if he was ready to launch, which he was.

Control was passed to the catapult officer and I went to 100% on the five finger signal. After the engine instruments had stabilized at 100% the throttles were moved into the AB range until an indication that both afterburners had lit was noted. Both throttles were then moved to the minimum afterburner detent. I saluted and the aircraft was launched. Full afterburner was selected during the launch.

Immediately after launch, the gear was raised at 165 knots and a clearing turn to port commenced. I reported the gear up to the RO. The flaps were then retracted and a starboard turn was commenced to parallel the fox corpen. I reported "flaps coming up" to the RO.

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARAGRAPH 66, OPNAVINST P3750.6Z

ENCLOSURE 4 TO CO, VF-84 SER 1-66A

The aircraft was steadied up on the fox corpen heading. At this time I noted that the port fire warning light was on. I reported to the RO that we had a port fire warning light, deselected afterburner on both engines, opened the wing dump valve and commenced a turn to port to stay close to the ship. Power on the port engine was then retarded to idle. I told the RO that the light was still on and to call the ship. He said that he had had a circuit breaker out but was able to reset it. I then called the ship and reported that we had a port fire warning light. Shortly after that transmission the port fire warning light went out. I told the RO the light was out and secured the dump valve assuming that it would be possible to stay airborne until the next recovery. The ship was advised that both lights were out and all instruments were normal. The starboard fire warning light came on only a few seconds later. I opened the dump valve and reported the starboard light to the RO. Altitude at this point was approximately 500 feet and the airspeed was approximately 230 knots. Our position was approximately 300° relative to the ship.

We began to lose altitude and the airspeed dropped to 190 knots. Power was reduced to 85% on the starboard engine and advanced to 85% on the port engine. The fire warning light on the port engine came on almost immediately. The throttles had become increasingly difficult to move up to this point and I assumed they froze since further throttle movement was not possible during the flight. A thump was felt which I thought was the gear extending, however a check of the landing gear indicators showed all gear in the up position. A flashing wheels light was noted at this time. The light went out within a short time. Altitude was increasing and airspeed was up to 220 knots as we passed abeam the ship on the port side at about two miles. The RO mentioned that he had no indication of a fire in the rear cockpit. We were still in a port turn. I checked the rearview mirrors for smoke. There was no smoke but fuel was still dumping from the port dump mast. I commented to the RO that we were not trailing smoke.

Passing about 225° relative to the ship I transmitted to the ship that we were coming up astern at 1200 feet and had both fire warning lights. All electrical power failed after the transmission. The RAT was extended and both generators were turned off. ICS was regained and the RO asked if the RAT was out. I said "affirmative" and told him I was jettisoning the external stores. At this time I pushed the External Stores Emergency Release button. I did not feel the stores leave the aircraft but could see where they had impacted in the water aft of the ship.

We continued up the starboard side of the ship at 1200 feet and 230 knots. Passing abeam I attempted one transmission on the UHF but received no acknowledgment. The RO reported he now had several circuit breakers out which he could not reset. Crossing in front of the ship, the RO reported that most of the circuit breakers had popped and he was unable to reset any of them. I made the decision to eject at this point and told the RO "It looks like we are going to have to get out" so he could prepare himself. He replied, "Roger, I'm going now", and ejected.

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARAGRAPH 66, OPNAVINST P3750.6E

ENCLOSURE 4 TO CO, VF-54 AAR SER 1-66A

After the RO ejected, I checked the instruments for some indication that the situation had improved. I noted the fuel flow on the port engine increase to 8-9000 pounds per hour, EGT exceed 1000° and RPM exceed 101%. Fuel flow then dropped below 3000 pounds per hour, EGT dropped below 600° and RPM began to decrease. I secured the port engine master switch.

Although engine instruments had been normal to this point and no smoke could be seen in the rearview mirrors, the possibility of a bad internal fire became readily apparent and I ejected.

The ejection was without incident. I heard the canopy leave the aircraft and was surprised at the acceleration from the seat, not expecting it to be so high. I heard the drogue gun fire and felt a turning motion after the seat left the aircraft. I released the face curtain and felt the opening shock of the chute almost immediately. The opening shock was hard and it caused the retaining straps on the seat pan to break and allow the seat pan to slide down below my knees. I checked the chute, it was fully deployed and the rod from the drogue gun was hanging over the canopy just a few feet from my head. I noticed that the aircraft had gone in behind me and to my left. I removed the oxygen mask, raised the seat pan to waist level and deployed the seat pan contents.

The raft and attached equipment fell out below me. I then released the starboard connection on the seat pan.

Impact with the water was hard. I was drifting backwards and landed feet first but then went down on my back hard. Both sides of the MK-3 were inflated and the parachute was released. As I released the right KOCH fitting first, I checked the chute and saw that it had completely collapsed. I drifted into the chute after it was released. In trying to swim away from it my feet became entangled in the shroud lines. A survival knife was used to cut the shroud lines and I was able to move away from the chute. The helicopter was hovering at this time with the rescue hook in the water. I released the seat pan and swam the few feet to the hook. Entry into helicopter was without incident.

Cockpit indications during this emergency were very confusing. Normal instrument readings with both fire warning lights on and the absence of trailing smoke made it difficult to determine that there was a fire or extreme overheat condition and not a faulty fire warning system. Loss of electrical power and the popped circuit breakers did confirm the seriousness of the situation. Cause of the electrical failure could not be understood at the time however. I strongly recommend that this type of emergency be covered in the NATOPS Manual thoroughly so that pilots will be aware of the possibility of an overheat condition if the generators are lost, radios are lost or circuit breakers cannot be reset.

I have been a designated naval aviator for nine years and have 2742 hours of flying time.

(b) (6)

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARAGRAPH 66, OPNAVINST P3750.6E

ENCLOSURE A TO CO, VF-84 AAR SER 1-66A

Statement of LTJG (b) (6), USNR, (b) (6), concerning CO, VP-84
Ser 1-66A, 17 June 1966, F-4B BuNo 152976, Pilot (b) (6)

We briefed at 1400 for a bombing hop. Four aircraft were to be in one flight. At 1445 I climbed into my flight gear. At 1500 we manned aircraft for a 1530 takeoff. After a normal preflight, we manned aircraft. The start was normal and we went through the takeoff check list by challenge and answer without a hitch. I verbally acknowledged that both transformer rectifiers were on the line and all circuits breakers in. Right after the clearing turn (b) (6) reported raising the gear and flaps and then a port fire warning light. I did not reply but rechecked the circuit breakers, all of which were still in. I looked behind me for any indication of fire but saw none. He again reported a port fire warning light and this time I saw a circuit breaker popped. I reset it, acknowledged the warning light and told him about the reset circuit breaker. It was the stab. posit. ind. circuit breaker.

I saw the dump on in the rearview mirror, but no smoke or flames. We were turning downwind and (b) (6) reported he couldn't maintain power to me and then called departure to report a fire warning light. He then reported lights out, indicators normal and told departure the same. Then he reported to me a starboard fire warning light and a few seconds later he said the port had come on again. I heard a thump and I again looked aft for indications of fire but still saw nothing unusual. I looked back at the circuit breaker panel and noticed a second group of circuit breakers out. There were about six to eight on panel one at the second and third column and extending from the second row down to about the fourth or fifth. There were also two isolated circuit breakers popped on panel two. I tried to reset the ones on panel one, but they stayed in only long as I held pressure on them. Departure told us to go to button two (the tower). I tried to acknowledge, but just then we had a total electrical failure. I positioned myself for possible ejection. I saw the RAT come out and the ICS came back on. I asked (b) (6) whether he had thrown out the RAT although I still don't know why I asked. He said he had and that he was jettisoning the external stores. I asked whether he was getting rid of the centerline too. He said he was.

I was hoping we might get aboard since we were just approaching aft the ship, but there were still three to five aircraft on the fantail. I told (b) (6) about the second group of circuit breakers and that I couldn't reset them. I tried to contact the tower but there was no response although I thought I heard the side tone of our transmitter. As we came past the starboard beam almost all the circuit breakers started popping randomly and singly. I was trying to reset them with both hands, but they would stay in only as long as I applied pressure. I again tried feeling the bulkheads for unusual heat, but I still could feel nothing extremely hot. I sat up and tried to look behind us for smoke or flames. I repeated to (b) (6) several times during this period that the circuit breakers were popping and could not be reset.

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARAGRAPH 66, OPNAVINST P3750.6E
ENCLOSURE 5 TO 88, VP-84 AAR SER 1-66A

(b) said "It looks like we'll have to get out", I said "Roger, I'm going", pushed my hips and shoulders in, my feet forward, looked at my palms and pulled. When I realized I was in my parachute, I released my mask, right Sierra fitting then left, pulled the apple and let my mask drop away (I thought). I released my seat pack and saw my raft stream below me. I felt for my KOCH fitting which were about 9 inches above my shoulder then pulled my hands away lest I release them inadvertently, I threw away my gloves and when I thought I was about to hit, I reached for my KOCH fittings again. I planed my body when I hit the water and released both fittings without any trouble. I inflated my MK3C and sort of dog paddled over to the raft. My mask had remained connected to me because of my G-suit fitting and extension hose and began fouling around my left leg and the raft line. When I realized what had happened I pulled the quick release fitting, untangled my mask and discarded it.

I did not climb in because my (b) (6) and I knew the helo would be there any second and then I would only have to get out of it again. So I held onto the skinny side. When I saw the helo approaching, I did a modified back paddle to the hook, grabbed it with my left hand and released the right rocket jet fitting. I swung both legs onto the hook, transferred hands and tried to release the left fitting but it wouldn't give. The helo crew began to lift me out of the water and I signaled to let me down again. This time I put my right hand on the springs, my left on the sliding assembly, but it still wouldn't release. The helo tried to lift me again and again I signaled to be lowered. This time I pulled in on the raft line for slack, wrapped my left hand under it to hold the slack, put my left hand on the sliding assembly, my right on the springs and again tried to release the left rocket jet fitting with no luck. I pulled out my survival knife, made a futile gesture at cutting the scott kit away. The helo crew lifted me all the way up, cut me loose and pulled me in.

I was designated a Naval Flight Officer on 24 June 1964, and I have 700 hours in the F4.

(b) (6)

F



SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARAGRAPH 66, OPNAVINST 3750.6E

ENCLOSURE 5 TO CO, VF-84 AMR SER 1-66A

Statement of (b) (6)

1-66A, 17 June 1966 F4B, BUENO 152976, Pilot (b) (6) AA, USN, concerning CO., VF-84, Ser

On 17 June 1966 I was plane captain on 206. I preflighted for the 1530 launch in accordance with MRC Cards 1 through 7 and found no discrepancies.

I accompanied the pilot on his preflight and he also noted no discrepancies. The RIO found a string hanging from door 73L. The door was removed and the string was found to be a lacing securing a bundle of wires. The lacing and the door were replaced.

After the turn up everything checked out during the pre-launch signals and the plane was sent to the cats.

(b) (6)

The board considers (b) (6) a credible witness

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARAGRAPH 66, OPNAVINST P3750.6E

ENCLOSURE 6 TO C.O., VF-84, AAR SER 1-66A

Statement of (b) (6), (b) (6) ADJ3, USN, concerning CO, VF-84, ser
1-66A, 17 June 1966, F4B, BuNo 152976, Pilot (b) (6)

After 206 turned up, I checked fuselage area, for visible oil, fuel or hydraulic leaks and found none. I then checked port and starboard auxiliary doors for oil fuel or hydraulic leaks and found none. During pre-flight and turn up everything was normal. Final inspection on catapults gave no reason to down aircraft.

(b) (6)
(b) (6) ADJ3
Line Trouble Shooter

The board considers (b) (6) a credible witness

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARAGRAPH 66, OPNAVINST P3750.6E

ENCLOSURE 6 TO CO, VF-84, AAR SER 1-66A

Statement of (b) (6), USN, Concerning C.O. VF-84 Ser 1-66A, 17
June 1966 F4B, BuNo 152976, Pilot (b) (6)

I was in Pri Fly when I first noticed the incident when the aircraft was off the port bow at approximately a mile to a mile and a half. I saw the RIO bail out at that time.

The aircraft appeared to be trailing a very thin stream of black smoke.

The aircraft continued around until it was off the port beam at approximately the same distance from the ship as when I first saw it.

The aircraft then went into a 10 to 15° nose down attitude and the pilot bailed out. The aircraft hit the water and appeared to disintegrate.

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

ABE3

USN

The board considers (b) (6) a credible witness

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARAGRAPH 66, OPNAVINST P3750.6E
ENCLOSURE 6 TO C.O. VF-84 AAR SER 1-66A

Statement of LCDR (b) (6) USN, (b) (6) concerning C.O. VP-84 Ser 1-66A, 17 June 1966 F4B, BUNO 152976, Pilot (b) (6)

I was the leader of a four aircraft flight from USS INDEPENDENCE on 17 June 1966. Scheduled launch time was 1530.

The flight commenced briefing at 1400 in Ready Room Five. All Pilots and RIO's were present except for ENS (b) (6) who had not returned from the previous flight. The flight mission was conventional weapons delivery of MK-86 and MK-76 bombs on Vieques impact area. Victory 203 and 211 were loaded with 6 MK-76 bombs while Victory 200 and 206 carried 6 MK-86 bombs. The pre-flight briefing was in accordance with the NATOPS briefing guide. Special note was made of launch procedures and gross weights, configuration and ordnance loads, safety precautions and switchology, formation and inflight procedures, target restrictions and safety precautions, recovery procedures and the emergency review for the day flap emergency lowering.

Aircraft assignments were made by the Squadron Duty Officer as follows:

203 LCDR (b) (6) /LTJG (b) (6)

211 LTJG (b) (6) /LTJG (b) (6)

200 LCDR (b) (6) /ENS (b) (6)

206 LCDR (b) (6) /LTJG (b) (6)

Crews then checked yellow sheet logs in the ready room. Air operations called pilots to man aircraft at 1500 at which time all crews proceeded expeditiously to the flight deck. The four aircraft were parked aft on the starboard side and across the ramp.

All crews had ample time to preflight their aircraft, check ordnance loads and strap in prior to the air officer starting jets. Victory 206 was parked furthest forward on the starboard side and thus was the first Victory aircraft to be launched from Catapult No. 3.

Shortly after launch, Victory 206 informed departure control that both fire warning lights on. A few moments later he advised that the port fire warning light was out and then that both fire warning lights were out. At this time, I was starting to taxi forward to catapult three and advised Victory 206 to dump fuel and land as soon as possible. Victory 206 made one more transmission that both fire warning light came on again when the throttles were advance beyond 90%. Again I broadcast instructions to land on the recovery that was about to commence.

As I taxied onto catapult three, my RIO, LTJG (b) (6) informed that he had Victory 206 in sight flying up the port side and that he looked "OK". After my launch, LTJG (b) (6) pointed out Victory 206 as the aircraft crossed ahead of us from left to right in a left hand turn as if turning to the down wind leg for landing. The aircraft was clean.

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARAGRAPH 66. OPNAVINST P3750.6E

ENCLOSURE 6 TO CO, VP-84, AAR SER 1-66A

As Victory 206 passed my port beam at about 1/2 mile, still in a slight left turn I observed a flash fire ball in the area of the port aft wing root near the port engine nozzle. Prior to this fire ball I had observed no unusual smoke or vapor trail other than the customary black smoke of the J79. I had started a left turn toward Victory 206 to check him visually when I observed the RIO eject. The RIO ejected 8 to 10 seconds after the fire ball flash which had occurred near the port engine. The pilot ejected approximately 6 to 8 seconds after the RIO. Victory 206 appeared to be about 1500 feet when the RIO ejected and his parachute opened at about that altitude. The aircraft was lower when the pilot ejected and his parachute opened about 1000 to 1100 feet.

The aircraft nosed over as soon as the pilot ejected and entered the water nose down and slightly right wing down. The aircraft struck the water and sank about 1000 feet beyond the point where the pilot landed in the water. Aircraft impact occurred roughly one or two seconds after the pilots parachute opened. Victory 206 sank immediately leaving no visible aircraft components on the surface. The impact area was well marked by the light yellow discoloration of the sea.

I advised Guntrain that both crewmembers had ejected and that both parachutes were observed. The two helos were over the scene immediately and picked up LCDR (b) (6) as I flew by the first time at 1000 feet.

It was easy to identify LCDR (b) (6) in the water but I could not distinguish LTJG (b) (6) until the second helo was over him. Rescue was fast and effective but LTJG (b) (6) seemed to be having problems getting aboard the helo. As soon as the helos reported both officers aboard I departed on my primary mission.

I have been a designated Naval Aviator for 12 years with 3480 flight hours.

(b) (6)

The Board attests that this is the statement of LCDR (b) (6)

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARAGRAPH 66, OPNAVINST P3750.6E

ENCLOSURE 6 TO CO, WP-84, AAR SER. 1-664

STATEMENT OF CDR (b) (6) (b) (6) (b) (6)
17 June 1966 F-4B Buno 152976, Pilot (b) (6)

CONCERNING CO, VF-84 SER 1-66A

On 17 June 1966 I was performing my duties as Navigator of INDEPENDENCE. About 1535, F4B, Side No. 206, BUNO 152976 flew up the starboard side of the ship. As the aircraft reached a point about one-half mile ahead of the ship I noticed the tail pipe of the port engine was lit up, however, the aircraft did not appear to be in afterburner. I continued to observe the aircraft and the fire appeared to pulsate or flash-up intermittently. I remarked to the Captain that I thought the aircraft was on fire. Immediately an attempt was made to communicate this fact to the aircraft. It was then we heard the aircraft, over the bridge ARC 27 say his fire warning light was on and that he was breaking upwind to commence his landing pattern. Immediately the aircraft broke to enter downwind. About one and one half minutes later the crew ejected.

(b) (5)

I have been a Naval Aviator for 22 years and have a total of 3950 hours single engine fighter time of which 2500 is jet time. My command was an F4B squadron.

(b) (6)

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARAGRAPH 66, OPNAVINST P3750.6E

ENCLOSURE 6 TO CO, VF-84 AAR SER 1-66A

Statement of CDR (b) (6) CVA-62 Assistant Air Officer, concerning CO, VF-84
SAC 1-66A, 17 June 1966, F-4B BuNo 152976, Pilot (b) (6)

At the time of this accident I was in charge of Primary Flight Control. I was being assisted by LT (b) (6). The first indication I received that an emergency might be in progress was when LT (b) (6) called my attention to the fact that an F-4B astern of the ship had jettisoned an external fuel tank. I also observed the falling tank. Almost immediately thereafter I was informed by CDR (b) (6) from Air Operations over the 1000 circuit that Victory 206 was experiencing fire warning lights and desired to come aboard as soon as possible. I asked CDR (b) (6) to switch Victory 206 to Tower frequency and told him that we could take the aircraft aboard without delay since there were only four aircraft waiting to be launched and that these could be taxied forward if necessary. At this time Victory 206 had disappeared from view on the starboard side of the ship. I then attempted contact with Victory 206 two or three times with negative results. Shortly after this I observed the aircraft on the port bow descending at approximately 3 to 4 miles and 3000 feet. One parachute had blossomed astern of the aircraft. I then contacted Angel 25 and 12 and informed them that an ejection had taken place and directed them to its location. At this time I observed the second ejection on the port stern. I then directed Angel 12 to the first ejection and Angel 25 to the second. After the second ejection the aircraft nosed down approximately 20 degrees and impacted with water. No fire or smoke was observed while the aircraft was in the air or on impact.

Angel 25 effected pickup of the second crewmen that ejected very shortly after arriving at the scene and returned to the carrier. Angel 12 seemed to experience some difficulty but did effect rescue of the first ejection and returned to the carrier shortly after Angel 25.

I have been a designated Naval Aviator for 16 years and have 4100 flight hours and 479 carrier arrested landings.

(b) (6)

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARAGRAPH 66, OPNAVINST P3750.6E

ENCLOSURE (6) TO C.O. VF-84 AAR SAC 1-66A

Statement of LCDR [REDACTED] (b) (6)
CO, VP-84, ser 1-66A, 17 June 1966, P-4B BuNo 152976, Pilot [REDACTED] (b) (6)

I was the Launching Officer on the Waist Catapults for the 1530 launch. 206 was the second aircraft to be launched off the number three catapult. He was launched at 1531, gross weight was computed as 47000 pounds and agreed upon by the pilot. 510 pounds of steam pressure was used and the shuttle end speed was 145 knots which is 11 knots over predicted. With 30 knots of wind indicated air speed should have been in the vicinity of 175 knots.

As the last two aircraft were being readied for launch Primary passed the word that a Phantom had two fire warning lights, and had dropped his tank. Primary wanted a clear deck as soon as possible. The last two Phantoms were shot off and as I was clearing the deck I looked over to port and saw a Phantom approximately one mile out at about 600 or 700 feet descending. I watched it until impact. It did not appear to be on fire or trailing smoke. I saw no one exit appeared to be a mile or so apart.

The launch of 206 appeared to be normal in all respects and the catapult functioned as advertised. I saw nothing separate from the aircraft during the launch.

I have been a qualified launching officer for twelve months, a naval aviator for 9 years, and have 2800 flight hours.

(b) (6)

LCDR, USN

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARAGRAPH 66, OPNAVINST P3750.6E
ENCLOSURE 7A TO CO, VP-84, AAR SER 1-66A

Statement of LCDR (b) (6)

17 June 1966, F-4B BuNo 152976, Pilot (b) (6)
USS INDEPENDENCE (CVA-62)

DATE 17 JUNE 1966

From: Meteorological Officer
To: Distribution List

Subj: Surface Weather Observation at the Time of Aircraft Accident

1. Aircraft Accident Data
- a. Date/Time of Occurrence 17/1538Q JUNE
- b. No./Type Aircraft Involved 206/F4B
2. Surface Weather Observation
- a. Date/Time of Observation 17/1542Q
- b. Ship/Station USS INDEPENDENCE (CVA-62)
- c. Position Lat. 18.03N Long. 64.39W
- d. Ships Heading-Speed 100/12
- e. Sky Condition 20 SCATTERED, HIGH SCATTERED f. Visibility 10
- g. Pressure Data Sea Level(mb) 1016.2 Altimeter(in hg) 30.00 Density Altitude(ft)+1920
- h. Temperature Data (deg. F.) Air 84.0 Dew Point 70.6 Sea Water 84.0
- i. Relative Humidity (Per Cent) 64
- j. Surface Winds (Deg./Kts.) Relative 355/36 True 093/24
- k. Sea Waves Direction (Deg) 090 Period(Sec) 03 Height(ft) 03
- l. Swell Waves Direction (Deg) NONE Period (Sec) Height (ft)

DISTRIBUTION: CO, OPS, Air Ops., VF 84, Aviation Safety Officer
Met. Office (File)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

OBSERVER:

LCDR, USN
Meteorologist

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARAGRAPH 66, OPNAVINST P3750.6B

ENCLOSURE 7B TO CO, VF-84, AAR SER 1-66A

Statement of LTJC [REDACTED] (b) (6)

17 June 1966 F4B, BUNO 152976, Pilot [REDACTED] USNR, (b) (6) concerning C.O. VF-84 Ser 1-66A,

On 17 June 1966, LCDR [REDACTED] (b) (6) successfully ejected from MODEX 206 BUNO 152976 using the Martin-Baker MK H5A/1 ejection seat (113-816 UNIT 1887). The seat was adjusted approximately 1/3 to 1/4 of upward travel. After proper positioning, he ejected using the face curtain at an altitude of 1200 feet at 230 KCAS. Normal separation and parachute deployment ensued. The kit release handle was actuated and water entry accomplished with MK3-C inflated.

The RIO of MODEX 206 BUNO 152976 was LTJC [REDACTED] (b) (6) from the crippled aircraft using the Martin-Baker ejection seat 116-808 UNIT 1870. The seat position was full down. After properly positioning himself, he ejected using the face curtain. Normal man/seat separation and parachute deployment ensued, and water entry accomplished with MK-3C not inflated and seat kit handle actuated.

The A/C, at the time of ejection was at 1200 feet and 230 KCAS in a wings level attitude.

Neither seat was recovered, but from all that can be determined, both functioned perfectly. The distress signals of the PRC-49B could be distinctly heard by airborne A/C.

The following modifications were incorporated in both seats:

1034, 1084, 1233, 1373, 1403, 1705, 1379, 1380, 1390, 1442, 1462, 1511, 1544, 1567, 1537, 1546, 1612, 1621, 2643, 1737, 1743, 1739, 2780, 1724, 1744, 1732, 2546, 2546, 2899, 1745, 1244, 2365, 2366, 2479, 1528, 1489, 2363, 2391, 2411, 2430, 2648, 1717, 2670, 1194, 1728.

Seat ASC - 19, 24, 25, 30, 38, 49

1 ASCB #1, 17 AM-1, 50 AM-1, 14, 53

ACC 41, 25 AM-1, 12

BACSEB - 31-58, 24-59, 29-59, 50-61, 4-60A, 17-61, 1761A, 28-62, 32-62, 5-63, 14-61A, 22-61.

CSEC - #5A1, 5

ACB - 62

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARAGRAPH 66, OPNAVINST P3750.6Z

ENCLOSURE 7C TO CO, VF-84, AAR SER 1-66A

INSPECTIONS:

BUWEPS msg 142152Z dtd DEC 62

BUWEPS ltr FWAE-221/590:HWB dtd 25 APR 62

BUWEPS ltr RMMO-332:JGB dtd 10 MAR 61

I have been a Naval Flight Officer for two years and have 950 flight hours, 750 of which are in the F4. I have been the Aviation Equipment Officer for three months.

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

LTJG, USNR

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARAGRAPH 66, OPNAVINST P3750.6E

ENCLOSURE 7C TO CO, VF-84, AAR SER 1-66A

FIGHTER SQUADRON EIGHTY FOUR
FLIGHT SCHEDULE
17 JUNE 1966

SDO:	LTJG ARD	EV	PC/LND	A/C	PILOT/RIO	TIN	MISSION	ORD	BTM	CHEM	NO	PERIOD
					(b) (6)							
1C	0930/1100						SR SHOOT	1 AIR7	3	31	W370 TOT	
									34		100-1045	
1D	0930/1100						OBST RVER			3		
2B	1100/1230						SPW SHOOT	1 AIR7	3	28	W370 TOT	
									32		1115-1215	
3B	1230/1400						COORD STRIKE	2 LAU32	3		TOT	
											1245-1345	
3Z	1230/1400						ACC	2 LAU 32	3		TOT	
											1245-1345	
4C	1400/1530						SPW SHOOT	1 AIR7	3	30	W370 TOT	
									32		1415-1515	
5B	1530/1700						SPW SHOOT	1 AIR7 or 6 MK76	3		W370 TOT	
							STRIKE				1545-1615	
5C	1530/1700						STRIKE	6 MK76	3		VIRQUE	
											1545-1615	
6B	1700/1830						STRIKE	6 MK76	3		VIRQUE	
											1545-1615	
7B	1830/1945						STRIKE	6 MK76	3		TWIN ROCKS/	
											FUNGI	
8B	1945/2115						STRIKE	6 MK76/ 6 MK24(1)	3		1910/1935	
											TWIN ROCKS/	
9B	2115/2300						AIC		1		FUNGI	
											2030-2100	

NOTES:

- Events 2B and 4C brief in Ready ONE 1445 prior to launch.
- Event 5B will join 5C if not needed for SPW Shoot - 6 MK76.
- See remarks on Air Plan for TGT Freqs.
- Beginning today until after ORI, ships TACAN will only be on 20 minutes prior to recover until recovery is complete.
- Emergency brief: Flap emergency lowering.

Submitted,

Approved,

(b) (6)


(b) (6)

Flight Officer

Commanding Officer

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARAGRAPH 66, OPNAVINST P3750.6E
ENCLOSURE 8 TO C.O., VR-84, AAR SER 1-66A

**Indications of Fire
Observed by Witnesses**



SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARAGRAPH 66, OPNAVINST P3750.63
ENCLOSURE (9) TO CO, VP-84, AAR Ser 1-66A

02/JVL:hf
3700
Ser: 63
3 FEB 1965

From: Commanding Officer, Fighter Squadron EIGHTY FOUR
To: Commander, U. S. Naval Aviation Safety Center

Subj: Abbreviated Aircraft Incident Report

Ref: (a) NAVWEPS 01-245 FDA-4-5, Sect 2 Fig 5-49

A. VF-84

B. 1-651

C. 22 January 1965

D. NAS Oceana

E. F4B, BuNo 151491, D/G

F. Introduction of high temperature bleed air into the right engine bay caused heat damage to numerous wire bundles, engine accessories, hydraulic seals, and hoses. Repair is considered well within squadron capability.

G. During post-check test hop, pilot was forced to use undue pressure to retard throttle out of A/B position. During attempts to manipulate throttle, it eventually became/stuck in full military. This discrepancy was followed shortly by a "check hydraulics" light, complete generator failure, and finally complete utility failure. Gear and flaps were blown down and an uneventful single engine field arrested landing was made on RAT power. R. H. Engine was shut down by use of Master Engine Switch.

H. The cause of this incident was the loss of gasket (item #17 ref (a)) due to a badly aligned installation of clamp at Bleed Air Duct Assembly (item 28 ref (a)) allowing hot air to escape into the engine bay. Heat damage to teflon lining of throttle linkage conduit and frozen bearings in the linkage caused freezing of throttle. R. H. generator failure was caused by heat damage to wire bundles and port generator probably failed due to "opposite generator tripout". No attempt was made to recycle the port generator in the air. No fire warning lights were illuminated and the Fire Warning circuits were checked and found to be operating properly. The loss of the utility system was the result of a failure of a hydraulic line to the port engine Bellmouth Actuator and was not associated with the loss of Bleed Air Duct Clamps.

I. N/A

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARAGRAPH 66, OPNAVINST P3750.6E

ENCLOSURE 10 TO CO, VF-84, AAR SER 1-66A

J. No

K. No

(b) (6)

Senior Member

ASO

Billet

Commanding Officer's comments and recommendations

1. Forwarded
2. The basic cause of this incident was the failure of the Bleed Air Duct connection due to misalignment or improper torque of the clamp. Installation procedures have been reemphasized to preclude future failures.
3. It has been squadron policy to check for bleed air leaks during post check engine run-up. The possibility exists that a poor installation of the clamp would not cause air leakage until after being exposed to high temperatures and pressure; therefore this command has instituted a procedure of checking bleed air ducting during the military power turnups. This check has been formalized in the Power Plants turn-up sheet.

J. E. WAITS

Copy to:
COMNAVAIRLANT
CVW-7

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARAGRAPH 66, OPNAVINST P3750.6B

ENCLOSURE 10 TO CO, VF-84, AAR SER 1-66A

S COMM NR 1267019
60 CB1283
RUCDG
DE RULRS 5562 169252Z
ZNR UUUU
R 18232Z
FM USS INDEPENDENCE
TO RUECWNO
RUCKDG/N VAL AVIATION SAFETY CENTER
INFO RUELM/NAVALHYSCOMHQ
ZEN/COMCAG DIV SIX
RUECRX/CG1SECONDFL
RUCKDA/COMNAVAIRLAST
RUWDAF/CU NAVAPAC
RUCKHD/CG FMFLANT
RUHLPB/CG FMFRAC
RUCKSL/RCW FOUR
RUEBBAA/RCW ONE TWO
RUCKHC/CINLANTFLT
RUEBGB/NAVIC ST LOUIS
RUCNOD/NAVIC EVALUATE CINCINNATI OHIO
RUWHNP/DIR EROSPACE SAFETY NORTON AFB
(RUECM/CHNAVAT)
BT
UNCLAS: FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

06/19/64

SUPP
AAR

PAGE 2 RULRS 5562 UNCLAS FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

SUPPLEMENTAL MESSAGE REPORT OF AAR
A. OPNAVINST P3750.5E

B. MY -180030Z

1. FAB, 152976, VF-84, SER I-66A, (b) (6)
2. COORDINATED STRIKE, CVA-61 TO CVA-62, VFR, 1 PLUS 30
3. ALFA, LST AT SEA
4. UNCONTROLLED COLLISION WITH WATER FOLLOWING EJECTION
5. UPON FLIGHT RETRACTION FOLLOWING CATAFULT LAUNCH, PILOT NOTED
ILLUMINATION OF PORT ENGINE FIRE WARNING LIGHT. STABILATOR TRIM INDICATOR CIRCUIT BREAKER WAS OBSERVED TO HAVE POPPED. AFTERBURNER WAS
DESELECTED ON BOTH ENGINES AND THE PORT THROTTLE WAS RETARDED TO IDLE.
AS PILOT RETARDED THROTTLE RIO RESET THE CIRCUIT BREAKER WHICH REMAINED IN.
THE FIRE WARNING LIGHT WENT OUT 5-10 SECONDS AFTER THE PORT ENGINE
REACHED IDLE RPM. PILOT ACTUATED WING FUEL DUMP SWITCH AND COMMENCED
A TURN DOWN (INI). AN ESTIMATED 32 SECONDS LATER AT 500 FEET 190 KNOTS
THE STARBOARD ENGINE FIRE WARNING LIGHT ILLUMINATED. PILOT SET BOTH
THROTTLES AT 65% PER CENT RPM AND SHORTLY THEREAFTER THE PORT FIRE
WARNING LIGHT ALSO ILLUMINATED. WITHIN 5 SECONDS A THUMP WAS HEARD
FOLLOWED BY ILLUMINATION OF THE FLASHING WHEELS WARNING LIGHT. APPROXIMATELY 10. SECONDS LATER BOTH GENERATORS FAILED ALMOST SIMULTANEOUSLY.

PAGE 3 RULRS 5562 UNCLAS FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

ELECTRICAL POWER WAS REGAINED BY RAM AIR TURBINE EXTENSION AND ALL
EXTERNAL STORES WERE JETTISONED BY EXTERNAL STORES EMERGENCY RELEASE
BUTTON. CLIMBING TO 1200 FEET AT 220 KNOTS THE PILOT WAS UNABLE TO MOVE
EITHER THROTTLE. TURNING UPWIND AFT OF THE SHIP, THE RIO OBSERVED NUMEROUS
CIRCUIT BREAKERS POPPING. INDICATIONS OF FIRE IN THE AREA AFT OF
THE TRAILING EDGE OF THE PORT WING ROOT WERE OBSERVED BY OTHER AIRBORNE
AIRCRAFT.

PILOT ORDERED RIO TO EJECT AT 1200 FEET 230 KNOTS. THE PILOT THEN
NOTED THE PORT EGT GAGE, INDICATING IN EXCESS OF 1000 DEGRES, RPM AT
181.5 PER CENT AND FUEL FLOW 88000-90000 PPH ON THE PORT ENGINE THE PORT
ENGINE WAS SECURED BY THE ENGINE MASTER. EGT AND FUEL FLOW OBSERVED TO
DECREASE. BOTH FIRE WARNING LIGHTS REMAINED ON. PILOT EJECTED DOWN WIND.
BOTH CREW MEMBERS RECOVERED BY HELO.

6. SEA STATE SLIGHT, 3 FOOT SWELLS, 2000 SCTD, NIGHT SCTD, 10 MILES,
TEMP 84, DEW PT 71.

7. SUSPECT FAILURE OF BLEED AIR DUCTING OR COUPLING FOLLOWDOSRY

BSJEDKX

TVHYDRAULIC AND/OR FUEL LINES DUE TO EXCESSIVE HEAT.

BT

182320Z APR

NNNN

AAR

36/18/66

SAFCEN DE COMM NR036/818
B593CBH042
PP RUCKDG
DE RULGRS 5496 169888
ZNR UUUUU
P 180030Z
FM USS INDEPENDENCE
TO RUECW/GNO
RUCKDG /NAVAL AVIATION SAFETY CENTER
INFO RUCKDG/NAVAIRSYSCOMHQ
ZEN/COMCARDIV SIX
RUECRX/COMSECONDFLT
RUCKDA /COMNAVAILANT
RUWDAF /COMDYVA

AC
RUCKHD/CG FMFLANT
RUHLPB /CG FMFPAC
RUCKSL /RCVW OFOUR
RUWDAK / RCVW ONE TWO
RUCKHC /CINCLANTFLT
RUCBGD/NASCR EVANDALE ST LOUIS
RUECC/NASCR EVANDALE CINN OHIO
RUWHNF/DIRECTOR AEROSPACE SAFETY NORTON AFB
RUECM/CHNAVMAT

BT
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PRELIMINARY MESSAGE REPORT OF AAR
A. OPNAVINST P3750.6E
1. F4B, 152976, FITRON 84
10-17 JUNE 1966, 1538Q, CVA-62, LAT 18-03N LONG 64-39W
3. COORDINATED STRIKE
4. ALFA
5. COLL
VIONN NQG WATER UNCONTROLLED. AFTER CATAPULT LAUNCH PILOT
EXPERIENCED FIRE WARNING LIGHTS B Q AWGINES, FOLLOWED BY ELECTRICAL
FAILURE. RAT EXTENDED AND EMERGENCY ELECTRICAL POWER REGAINED.

PAGE TWO 5496 RULGRS UNCLAS
EXTERNAL STORES JETTISONED. AFTER APPROXIMATELY LSIX MINUTES OF
FLIGHT THROTTLES FROZE IN 85-87 PER CENT RANGE, ABNORMALLY HIGH EGT
NOTED PORT ENGINE, AND LOSS OF ENGINE THRUST NOTED. CREW EJECTED
ALONGSIDE OF CVA-62 AND RECOVERED BY HELO.

6. (b) (6) , LCDR (b) (6) USN, 1310, ACTIVE, NONE
7. (b) (6) LTJG, (b) (6) USNR, 1325, ACTIVE, MINOR
8. NONE
9. EJECTION SEATS UTILIZED BY BOTH CREWMEMBERS
BT

F4B VNU 152976 VF84 AAC 1-66

180003